The Reference Point for Sympathy as the Foundation of Morality: The “Self” of Confucius and the “Spectator” of Adam Smith
Vol. 43 No. 3 09/2013
Title |
The Reference Point for Sympathy as the Foundation of Morality: The “Self” of Confucius and the “Spectator” of Adam Smith |
Author |
Chow, Kwok-ching |
Genre |
Article |
Pages |
461-480 |
Download |
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Language |
Chinese |
Key words |
Confucius, ren, self, sympathy, Adam Smith, spectator |
Abstract |
Both Confucius’ theory of ren and Adam Smith’s notion of “moral sentiments” are rooted in human love, which presumes the interpersonal presence of human“sympathy;” and in turn “sympathy” requires a reference point with which one’s sentiments (“-pathy”) are identified (“syn-”). With regards to this reference point, Confucius proposes a “self” while Adam Smith puts forward a “spectator.” The “self” of Confucius is somewhat vague and includes many hidden specifications, whereas Adam Smith’s “spectator” is formulated to stress that no considerations of material benefit are involved in the expression of sympathy. However, Smith’s concept fails to account for ethical considerations originating from one’s innermost conscience. To address these, Adam Smith has to coin another expression— “the man within” — which appears to contradict his notion of “spectator.” In comparison, Confucius’ conception of the “self” seems to be more integral and consistent. |