“Menschheit” in the Philosophy of Kant and Its Meaning for Cultural Philosophy
Vol. 52 No. 2 6/2022
Title |
“Menschheit” in the Philosophy of Kant and Its Meaning for Cultural Philosophy |
Author |
Lee Ming-huei |
Genre |
Article |
Pages |
215-246 |
DOI |
10.6503/THJCS.202206_52(2).0001 |
Download |
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Language |
Chinese |
Key words |
Kant, Rousseau, culture, human nature, Menschheit |
Abstract |
In the philosophy of Kant (1724-1804), the term “Menschheit” is probably one of the most misunderstood terms. Chinese translators often translate it as renxing (人性, human nature), which is confused with Kant’s term “Menschennatur.” English translators often translate it as “humanity,” which is confused with Kant’s term “Humanität” (=Menschlichkeit). In Kant’s work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the term “Menschheit” refers to the person as “end in itself,” or the moral subject. In most cases, Kant uses the term “Menschheit” in this sense. “Menschheit” in this sense belongs to the trans-empirical level of the metaphysics of morals, while “human nature” belongs to the empirical level of anthropology. The two cannot be confused. But in Kant’s writings, there is an exception to this use of the term “Menschheit.” This exception appears in his work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Here Kant mentions three kinds of “original predisposition to good in human nature,” the second of which is the predisposition to the “Menschheit” in humans as living and at the same time rational beings. This predisposition originates in “physical and yet comparing self-love,” for which technical practical reason is required. This “self-love” can be traced back to Rousseau’s (1712-1778) “amour propre” and has the meaning of cultural creation. Rousseau regarded “amour propre” as the source of human degeneration and misfortune, whereas Kant regarded “Menschheit” in human nature as the driving force for cultural creation and established his cultural philosophy accordingly. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant pointed out that culture makes human beings “the final purpose of nature.” The “final purpose of nature” belongs to natural teleology. But “natural teleology” is not a self-sufficient system. It must presuppose an “ultimate purpose” in order to be elevated to “moral teleology.” This “ultimate purpose” is just “Menschheit” as moral subject. With the dual meaning of the term “Menschheit,” Kant’s cultural philosophy and moral philosophy are combined into a more complete system. |