

A Thirteenth-Century View: Virtue, Valor, and Violence in *Helin yulu* 鶴林玉露*

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ABSTRACT

Synthesizing entries from the mid-thirteenth century *biji* (miscellany 筆記), *Helin yulu* 鶴林玉露, this article argues that the work, with its bleak view of contemporary times and many tales of violence, can be seen in part as preparing its Southern Song readers for the imminent conflict with the Mongol empire. The text's vision weaves together political decline and virtuous heroes, as well as a moral heaven and an amoral world. Such complexity and unpredictability leads its compiler, Luo Dajing 羅大經 (c. 1195-after 1252), to define wisdom (*zhi* 智) as adaptability and supply examples throughout society.

Key words: *Helin yulu* 鶴林玉露, Luo Dajing 羅大經, *biji* 筆記, Song literati

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1. Introduction

Some say, “The way to use troops is to kill people like scything grass and to spend money as if it were water.” I say, “If the army has no rewards, the officers will not go forth. If the army has no money, the officers will not come. It is acceptable to spend money as if using water. As for killing people like cutting grass, that is not a correct view. Now military affairs inherently call for handling matters with strictness. Yet war contains rites and music, and compassion and love. The reason why one reluctantly executes those who do not follow orders is that as soon as someone tempts soldiers to act out of line, the whole army becomes unburied bones. Executing one man is how one preserves thousands and ten-thousands of men. How can one view killing many people as ability and view addiction to killing as something noble? If it is as they say, then Zhao Chongguo [137 B.C.-52 B.C.], Wang Zhongsi [706-749], and Cao Bin [931-999] would not match the likes of Bai Qi [332 B.C.-257 B.C.].”

或曰，用兵之法，殺人如刈草，使錢如使水。余曰，軍無賞，士不往；軍無財，士不來。使錢如使水可也，乃若殺人如刈草，則非至論。夫軍事固以嚴濟，然禮樂慈愛，戰所蓄也。所以不得已而誅不用命者，蓋一有逗撓亂行，則三軍暴骨矣。誅一人，所以全千萬人，豈以多殺為能、以嗜殺為貴哉？若如所言，則趙充國、王忠嗣、曹彬反不若白起輩矣。¹

These remarks appear in the mid-thirteenth century *biji* (miscellany 筆記), *Helin yulu* (*Jade Dew in Crane Forest*), completed in 1252 by the minor official, Luo Dajing 羅大經 (c. 1195-after 1252). In this entry, Luo appeals to Confucian precepts and their applicability to even large-scale armed combat. Be they rites and music, or more abstract values, such as love and compassion, Confucian teachings have their place in the

¹ Luo Dajing, *Helin yulu* 鶴林玉露 [hereafter *Helin*], annot. Wang Ruilai 王瑞來, *Tang Song shiliao biji congtan* 唐宋史料筆記叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), *bing bian*, *juan* 2, p. 264.

organization of mass conflict. To clinch his argument, Luo turns to history, proposing a vital distinction between three successful generals from the Han, Tang, and Song dynasties, on the one hand, and a military leader infamous for his slaughter of 400,000 prisoners after the Qin kingdom's defeat of Zhao in 260 B.C.² The Qin 秦 dynasty's (221 B.C.-206 B.C.) short duration, presumably, demonstrates the futility and immorality of the latter's gratuitous bloodletting.

The comments do more than repeat Confucian principles. First, Luo declares that securing an army's loyalty requires not so much charismatic benevolence or strict ritual practice, but rather great quantities of money. He does not employ the term "profit," or *li* 利, and its place in successful policy execution, but the implication is clear. Second, his argument acknowledges that effective armies sacrifice their own for the sake of the unit's long-term survival. Ill-advised, untimely benevolence and lenience will swiftly lead to calamity. Although Luo concludes with an insistent, Confucian position, he also gives competing views a hearing and concedes their merits to an extent. In short, the entry constitutes a mix of moral truth and political exigency.

This entry opens the door to two larger issues. First, how can studying *biji* deepen our understanding of Chinese intellectual and cultural history?³ Specifically, can individual anthologies be seen to pursue larger, if largely implicit, intentions? Often *biji* prefaces portray collections as amalgamations of overheard stories, memorable conversations, and things noticed while reading off-duty, recorded for the writer's

² At least one historian finds this number "unreasonable." See Derk Bodde, "The State and Empire of Ch'in," in Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 1: *The Ch'in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.-A.D. 220* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 100.

³ *Biji* often encompass various traditional bibliographic classifications, such as unofficial histories (*yeshi* 野史), miscellaneous histories (*zashi* 雜史), or miscellaneous schools (*zajia* 雜家). For important studies of Song *biji*, see Peter K. Bol, "A Literati Miscellany and Sung Intellectual History: The Case of Chang Lei's *Ming-tao tsa-chih*," *Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies*, 25 (1995), pp. 121-151; Cong Ellen Zhang, "To Be 'Erudite in Miscellaneous Knowledge': A Study of Song (960-1279) *Biji* Writing," *Asia Major*, Third Series, 25.2 (2012), pp. 43-77; Cong Ellen Zhang, "Of Revelers and Witty Conversationalists: Song (960-1279) *Biji* Writing and the Rise of a New Literati Ideal," *The Chinese Historical Review*, 23.2 (2016), pp. 130-146; Ronald Egan, "Shen Kuo Chats with Ink Stone and Writing Brush," in Jack W. Chen and David Schaberg (eds.), *Idle Talk: Gossip and Anecdote in Traditional China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 132-153; Hilde de Weerd, *Information, Territory, and Networks: The Crisis and Maintenance of Empire in Song China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), pp. 281-426.

amusement and to preserve those treasured moments for posterity. Luo followed this pattern in the preface to the anthology's first installment in 1248, noting "When occasionally [during conversation with associates] our thoughts happily came together or we were moved to deep feelings, I always ordered a youngster to write them down" 或欣然會心，或慨然興懷，輒令童子筆之。⁴ *Biji* writers, however, were selective and pursued agendas, as they did at the office. Unofficial histories, or "private histories" (*sishi* 私史), continued political feuds and sometimes faced official proscription.⁵ In the preface to the anthology's second installment in 1251, Luo illustrates his awareness that his work did more than present highlights from leisurely conversation,

Some say, "You record events and relate remarks, making determinations based on your views. Don't you fear it will stir up ridicule that you exceed your station and act rashly? What will you do?" I say, "Woodchoppers discuss kings, and youngsters understand kingdoms. How could I go beyond my station? As for my acting rashly, when 'I doubt, I transmit my doubts.' The *Spring and Autumn Annals* permits it."

或曰：「子記事迹言，斷以己意，懼賈僭妄之譏奈何？」余曰：「樵夫談王，童子知國，余烏乎僭？若以為妄，則疑以傳疑，《春秋》許之。」⁶

Whether or how the first installment had landed Luo in hot water is unclear, but this article takes Luo at his word and proposes to analyze his doubts.

⁴ *Helin, jia bian*, "Zixu 自序," p. 1. Luo's language recalls also Wang Xizhi's 王羲之 "Preface to Poems from Orchid Pavilion" (*Lanting shi xu* 蘭亭詩序).

⁵ The most notable episodes include Qin Gui's 1145 ban on private histories and the 1202 ban, which covered all such works save for a handful of monumental works, such as the *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian* 續資治通鑑長編 and the *Dongdu shilue* 東都事略. For a closer look at Qin's efforts, see Charles Hartman, "The Making of a Villain: Ch'in Kuei and Tao-hsüeh," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 58.1 (1998), pp. 59-146, especially pp. 96-103; Li Xinchuan 李心傳, *Jiannan yilai chaoye zaji* 建炎以來朝野雜記, annot. Xu Gui 徐規, vol. 1, *Tang Song shiliao biji congkan* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), *juan* 6, pp. 149-150.

⁶ *Helin, yi bian*, "Zixu," p. 117; Ruan Yuan 阮元 (ed.), *Chunqiu guliangzhuan zhushu* 春秋穀梁傳注疏, annot. Lu Xuanxun 盧宣旬, *Chongkan Songben shisanjing zhushu fu jiaokanji* 重刊宋本十三經注疏附校勘記, vol. 7 (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1997), *juan* 3, p. 32b.

Second, this anthology opens a valuable window onto mid-thirteenth century cultural history. As Song historians know well, sources diminish markedly for the final forty years of the dynasty. This scarcity makes *Helin yulu* all the more valuable in answering questions about the outlook of Chinese literati during a troubled time. *Daoxue* 道學 doctrine had become examination orthodoxy, and the movement's eleventh- and twelfth-century stalwarts had gained honored places in state ritual, but court politics and literati ways remained mired in petty intrigue and strife. How then did one literatus view this mix of intellectual renewal and political decay? Moreover, the dynasty faced the specter of foreign invasion. The Mongols in the 1230s annihilated the Jin dynasty, which even in its feeble, final decades had held off Song forces. While the 1240s and early 1250s passed without major fighting, Chinese officials undoubtedly well remembered how Mongol armies had devastated parts of the Song frontier and occupied Sichuan. Yet the picture remained complicated. As Fang Cheng-hua 方震華 has shown, many literati, despite the unmistakable might of this new foe, took the immediate recovery of the Central Plain as a moral imperative. Dissent from this view drew accusations of appeasement and comparison with the treacherous Qin Gui 秦檜 (1090-1155).⁷ The renewal of hostilities was only a matter of time. Indeed, one cannot but be struck by how often his anthology's items deal with strife, violence, and war.⁸

This article synthesizes different parts of *Helin yulu* and proposes that they present a coherent, complex point of view, which prepares readers in various ways for the conflict to come. The anthology's "opinionated" quality was noticed by the *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書 bibliographers, who remarked on the work's discursiveness (*yinshi shulun* 因事抒論). Noting Luo's propensity to present two sides of an issue (seen above), they attributed this turn of mind to his being "rooted in the literary masters as well as admiring the *daoxue* luminaries" 本文章之士而兼慕道學之名.⁹ This duality is useful, but one can find other fruitful ones. Specifically, this miscellany presents an interplay between

⁷ Fang Cheng-hua, "Fuchou dayi yu Nansong houqi dui wai zhengce de zhuanbian 復仇大義與南宋後期對外政策的轉變," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊, 88.2 (2017), pp. 309-345.

⁸ In addition to his anecdotes, Luo in places comments about military fortifications. See *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 29; *juan* 4, pp. 60, 68.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *fulu* 3, p. 377.

Confucian rectitude and pragmatic strategy, and between optimism and discontent, as the text looks as much to the present and near future, as much as it does to the past. After introductory comments on the writer and his anthology, I will first sketch how Luo portrayed a bleak, critical picture of his era. Second, I will show he complemented this view with passages about worthy individuals and the key virtues that they embodied. Next, I will turn to how various entries, taken together, suggest strategies and approaches that readers might use to cope with unpredictable circumstances. Finally, I will demonstrate how Luo sets forth, after a fashion, a few central, sometimes contradictory laws that order the world. In sum, the anthology reveals how one learned man drew from his heritage and experiences to adapt to his time and its challenges.

2. The Author and His Work

We know little about Luo Dajing. Wang Ruilai, editor of the collection's punctuated edition, estimates that Luo, a native of Jizhou 吉州 in present-day Jiangxi province, was born about 1195.¹⁰ Luo's father, Luo Maoliang 羅茂良, studied with his illustrious landsman Yang Wanli 楊萬里 (1127-1207) and associated with Yang's son, Yang Changru 楊長孺 (fl. early thirteenth century) and as well as the grand councilor Zhou Bida 周必大 (1126-1204). Luo's remarks leave no doubt about his own familiarity and admiration for the Yang family, while several entries suggest that he knew well the household of the philosopher Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1193), another Jiangxi luminary. As for Luo's career, local gazetteers report that he passed the prefectural examinations in

¹⁰ Ibid., "Dianjiao shuoming 點校說明," p. 1. Important sources dealing with Luo's biography include the introduction to the punctuated edition. See *ibid.*, pp. 1-7; *fulu* 1, pp. 350-361; Takahashi Ryōsei 高橋良政, "Kakurin gyokuro no hanpon ni tsuite 『鶴林玉露』の版本について," *Sakura bun ronsō* 桜文論叢, 54 (2002), pp. 57-63; Gotō Junichi 後藤淳一, "Kakurin gyokuro ni miru Shushi sonshū no nen 『鶴林玉露』に見る朱子尊崇の念," *Chūgoku shibun ronsō* 中國史文論叢, 28 (2009), pp. 93-109; Wang Ruilai, "Helin yulu zhuzhe Luo Dajing shengping shiji bukao 「鶴林玉露」著者羅大經生平事迹補考," *Zhongguo dianji yu wenhua* 中國典籍與文化, 2 (2012), pp. 35-44. The last article is discussed in Li Xiaolong 李小龍, "Ro Daikei no seisotsunen oyobi menkan no genin shiron 羅大經の生卒年及び免官の原因試論," *Edo fūga* 江戸風雅, 15 (2017), pp. 3-15. Li, as well as Kai Qiling 凱其玲 in her Nanchang University MA thesis, maintains that Luo was born ten years earlier, in the mid-1180s. Kai Qiling, "Luo Dajing yu Helin yulu yanjiu 羅大經與鶴林玉露研究," MA Thesis (Nanchang: Nanchang daxue, 2007).

1222 and won his *jinshi* 進士 degree in 1226. He served as an administrator in the law section in the Rongzhou 容州 prefectural office (in present-day Guangxi) about 1234, where he learned the restorative properties of the betel-nut.¹¹ Later he worked as military judge in Fuzhou 撫州, in eastern Jiangxi, in 1251-1252, and was dismissed as part of a larger purge conducted by Ye Dayou 葉大有 (*jinshi* 1232) against Xu Lin 徐霖 (1215-1262) and his subordinates. The rest of his professional life remains a blank.

Helin yulu belongs to the large crop of Southern Song *biji* composed by low-ranking literati. In Luo's case, apart from this work, nothing else from his brush survives.¹² Hilde de Weerdt has suggested that men compiled these works for various purposes, such as sharing information, establishing personal relationships, and improving their symbolic and social capital.¹³ Despite the author's obscurity, the anthology found a wide circulation for centuries, as seen in Yuan, Ming, and Qing *biji* and encyclopedias.¹⁴ Late imperial and modern scholars have prized Luo's remarks about poetry and language, especially concerning Du Fu's 杜甫 (712-770) work.¹⁵

3. The Deplorable Present

Chinese literati looked at the world through bifocal lenses. First, they lived, for the most part, under a dynasty that possessed the Mandate of Heaven and so necessarily enjoyed the blessings of benevolent rule. Second, the idyll of the ancient Sages, as well as the counsel of Confucius and Mencius, had grown remote, and so learned men must

¹¹ *Helin, bing bian*, juan 1, p. 247.

¹² One catalog lists a commentary on the *Book of Changes* (*Yijie* 易解), but this work has been long lost.

¹³ Hilde de Weerdt, *Information, Territory, and Networks*, p. 358.

¹⁴ Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀 (fl. 1360-1368), for example, quoted in full Lu's portrayal of life as a retired scholar. See Tao Zongyi, *Nancun chuogeng lu* 南村輟耕錄, *Yuan Ming shiliao biji congan* 元明史料筆記叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), juan 15, p. 184; *Helin, bing bian*, juan 4, p. 304.

¹⁵ See, for example, Zhang Ruijun 張瑞君, "Helin yulu Dushi lun tanxi 《鶴林玉露》杜詩論探析," *Shanxi daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 山西大學學報 (哲學社會科學版), 36.5 (2013), pp. 20-23; Wang Hongxia 王紅霞 et al., "Luo Dajing Helin yulu zhong de Du Fu ji qi shige 羅大經《鶴林玉露》中的杜甫及其詩歌," *Du Fu yanjiu xuekan* 杜甫研究學刊, 2 (2013), pp. 41-48. In addition, online databases list many MA theses that examine Luo's poetry criticism and remarks on language, which I have not been able to gain access to.

suffer the ills of a benighted world. To elaborate on Fan Zhongyan's 范仲淹 (989-1052) assertion that officials ought to worry before the rest of the world worried, literati should expect troubling news. In *Helin yulu*, Luo Dajing, despite the delights of "pure conversation," found ample reason to be distressed about his times. In particular, one can point to three central problems that afflicted the Song.

3.1 Bad Councilors

Scholar-officials often attributed the dynasty's troubles to its autocratic grand councilors, specifically Wang Anshi 王安石 (1019-1086), Cai Jing 蔡京 (1047-1126), Qin Gui, and Shi Miyuan 史彌遠 (1164-1233). Luo was no exception. Several passages faulted Wang, whose advocacy and heedless implementation of statist political and economic measures plunged the dynasty into bitter, lethal factionalism. Luo's criticisms followed well-worn paths. They denounced Wang for stressing institutional changes and even praising the Legalist Qin dynasty minister, Shang Yang 商鞅 (c. 390 B.C.-338 B.C.), for his administrative effectiveness. In Luo's view, just as Li Si 李斯 (280 B.C.-208 B.C.) had adopted Xunzi's 荀子 (fl. third century B.C.) ideas and led the Qin state into eventual disaster, so did Wang's policies open the door to Zhang Dun 章惇 (1035-1105) and Cai Jing, and the collapse of the Northern Song.¹⁶ The eleventh-century grand councilor's fixation with ancient systems had dismal consequences, akin to Wang Mang's 王莽 (c. 45 B.C.-A.D. 23) penchant for the well-field (*jingtian* 井田) system and Fang Guan's 房琯 (697-763) ancient battle tactics in the disastrous battle at Chentaoxie 陳濤斜 in 756.¹⁷ Paired with this intellectual confusion was Wang's lack of self-cultivation. In particular, Wang neglected to reflect on and rectify his mind, which in the wake of *daoxue*'s ascendance had become the primary task for the Confucian gentleman, as seen in Luo's invocation of Lü Zuqian's 呂祖謙 (1137-1181) commentary on the *Shangshu* 尚書.

In the *Documents*, the spirit and thinking of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, [King] Wen, [King] Wu, and the Duke of Zhou are lodged completely within. If those that

¹⁶ *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 186-187.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *juan* 5, p. 202.

look at the *Documents* do not seek their minds' location, then what good is it? Yet in wishing to pursue the mind of the ancients, one must first seek his own mind. Only then can one see the minds of the ancients.

《書》者，堯、舜、禹、湯、文、武、周公之精神心術盡寓其中，觀《書》者不求其心之所在，夫何益！然欲求古人之心，必先求吾心，乃可見古人之心。¹⁸

Using broad strokes, Luo painted Wang as a colossal failure:

[Wang] had a mind that could read books, and they filled his breast. But being obstinate and arrogant, his mind was separated from the ancients by an abyss as great as the heavens.

夫着一能讀書之心，橫於胸中，則錮滯有我，其心已與古人天淵懸隔矣。¹⁹

This mix of character flaws and conceptual misunderstandings about the basics of learning produced extremely poor judgement. The most grievous cases lay in his use of nefarious, vengeful officials such as Lü Huiqing 呂惠卿 (1032-1111) and Zhang Dun, who restored Wang's policies and deepened the factionalism of the late Northern Song.²⁰ Less consequential but telling evidence could also be found in Wang's remarks about historical figures. In Wang's mistaken view, the ill-fated Han consort Wang Zhaojun 王昭君 (first century B.C.) enjoyed a happier life in Xiongnu 匈奴 captivity than at the Chinese court, and the official Feng Dao 馮道 (882-954), notorious for his service to different dynasties, was no less than a tenth-century bodhisattva.²¹ Wine and women,

¹⁸ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 5, p. 89. The *Shangshu* as found in the modern edition of Lü's collected works lacks the clinching sentence, "Only then can one see the minds of the ancients" 乃可見古人之心. See Lü Zuqian, *Zengxiu Donglai shushuo* 增修東萊書說, in Huang Linggeng 黃靈庚 et al. (eds.), *Lü Zuqian quanji* 呂祖謙全集, vol. 3 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2008), *juan* 1, p. 21.

¹⁹ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 5, p. 89.

²⁰ Ibid., *juan* 2, p. 34.

²¹ Luo reproached Wang for a couplet from the second poem of "Aria for the Bright Consort" (*Mingfei qu* 明妃曲), which read "The Han's grace was slight, the Tartar's grace profound/ Happiness in this life rests in understanding another's heart" 漢恩自淺胡自深，人生樂在相知心. Like Fan Chong 范冲 (?-1141),

Wang believed, posed no threat to rulers, leading Luo to compare him unfavorably to the ancient advisor-cum-merchant-cum-immortal Fan Li 范蠡 (536 B.C.-448 B.C.), who possessed the far-sightedness to take with him the beauty Xi Shi 西施, lest her charms distract the Yue kingdom ruler, as they had so lethally done to the king of the vanquished Wu state.²² That being said, Luo concurred with Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) in admiring his verse and clearing Wang of charges of petty favoritism.²³ Despite his supposed affinity for *daoxue*, Luo did not censure Wang for use of Buddhist and Daoist concepts and language. As did countless literati, Luo regarded Wang Anshi, two centuries after his passing, as a monumental, almost mythical figure, whose influence later generations were compelled to adapt to and recover from.

Helin yulu also treated harshly the Southern Song's notorious grand councilors. Wang Anshi's crimes were matched by those of Qin Gui. Wang had ripped apart a unified dynasty, and Qin had failed to restore a shattered dynasty's unity.²⁴ In general, the collection accorded Qin far less space than Wang, as Luo consolidated his remarks in one of the anthology's longest entries.²⁵ By the mid-thirteenth century, one speculates that many stories about Qin circulated in educated circles, and it is instructive to see which accounts Luo chose to transmit. On the one hand, he seconded Zhu Xi's view of Qin as a Song traitor and Jin agent, who infamously persuaded emperor Song Gaozong 宋高宗 (r. 1131-1162) to sue for peace when Song military forces had gained the upper hand on the battlefield. This misdeed was, in Luo's view, unforgivable.²⁶ Other confirmations of Qin's perfidy included his exchange with Hong Hao 洪皓 (1088-1155). After fifteen years as a Song envoy at the Jin court, Hong returned south in 1143 and received a court appointment. According to Luo, Hong conveyed greetings from the Jin

Luo saw the line as an expression of disloyalty. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, p. 186. Many commentators disagreed and said they failed to see the line in the proper context. See Wang Anshi, *Wang Jinggong shizhu bujian* 王荊公詩注補箋, annot. Li Zhiliang 李之亮 (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2002), *juan* 6, pp. 111-112.

²² *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 186-187.

²³ Ibid., p. 187; *jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 37. For Zhu Xi's views on Wang, see Li Huarui 李華瑞, *Wang Anshi bianfa yanjiu shi* 王安石變法研究史 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004), pp. 32-48. For a survey of Wang's image in *biji* literature, see *ibid.*, pp. 166-199.

²⁴ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 3, pp. 49-50.

²⁵ Ibid., *juan* 5, pp. 78-79.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 79.

ruler to Qin, and the gibe won Qin's hatred.²⁷

Beyond his treachery, Qin's vulgarity also won Luo's opprobrium. As a National University 太學 student, he proved eager and adept at menial tasks, such as organizing drinking parties, and as a grand councilor, Qin evinced an insatiable appetite for flattery, demonstrated in the construction of his Hall of Unified Virtue that Matches Heaven (*Yide ge tian ge* 一德格天閣). The building's name implicitly compared Qin with the ancient sage advisor Yi Yin 伊尹 (fl. 1500 B.C.) and inspired poetry from unnamed literati likening Qin to worthies such as Guan Zhong 管仲 (c. 723 B.C.-645 B.C.) and the Zhou King Xuan 周宣王 (r. 827 B.C.-781 B.C.). Their obsequious verses gained their authors immediate promotions. Both references honored figures known for their defense of Han Chinese culture against foreign aggression, although the entry does not elaborate on this irony. For some reason, Luo did not refer here to Qin's literary inquisition, which elicited posterity's condemnation.²⁸ His focus remained squarely on foreign affairs.²⁹

²⁷ In Luo's account, the well-wisher was Talan 撻辣, who had died four years earlier. Ibid. The story's source would appear to be Hong Gua's 洪适 (1117-1184) record of conduct (*xingzhuang* 行狀) for Hong Hao. Hong Gua names the well-wisher as Shinian 室撻, an aide to Talan. See "Xianjun shu 先君述" in Zeng Zaozhuang 曾棗莊 and Liu Lin 劉琳 (eds.), *Quan Song wen* 全宋文, vol. 214 (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe; Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006), *juan* 4744, pp. 11-12. While Li Xinchuan (1166-1243) was skeptical about aspects of Hong Gua's version of Qin Gui's return to the Song, he did not express doubt about the Qin-Hong conversation. See Li Xinchuan, *Jiannan yilai xianian yaolu* 建炎以來繫年要錄 [hereafter *JYYL*], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), *juan* 38, p. 720. Curiously, Luo neither mentions the policy disputes between Qin and Hong nor how the former demoted the latter to a provincial position. For fuller expositions of this incident, see Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin (eds.), *Quan Song wen*, vol. 214, *juan* 4744, pp. 11-12; *JYYL*, vol. 3, *juan* 150, p. 2409.

²⁸ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 5, pp. 78-79. Luo excerpts Qin's well-known petition in 1127 to the Jin to keep the Zhao family on the throne and not establish the puppet state of Zhang Bangchang 張邦昌 (1081-1127). The appeal failed, and the Jurchens took Qin with them to the north. Ibid., p. 78. Historians have differed about the text's authorship. See Charles Hartman, "The Making of a Villain," pp. 59-146, especially pp. 64-67, 78. Qin, put simply, looks very virtuous in this scene, and Luo remarks that Qin's "feelings in the Jin camp later changed" 情態遂變. *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 5, p. 78. Elsewhere, in a discussion of "calamities brought on by poetry" (*shihuo* 詩禍), he comments curiously, "Since [the start of the Southern Song], 'calamities brought on by poetry' have virtually ceased" 渡江以來，詩禍殆絕. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, p. 188.

²⁹ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 2, pp. 26-27. This anecdote took its place in a series where powerful officials had received better and more plentiful delicacies than the imperial family had. In the earlier instances, however, when the throne learned of these discrepancies, officials suffered demotion and even execution for their excesses.

By contrast, Han Tuozhou 韓侂胄 (1154-1207) appeared more pathetic than pernicious.³⁰ For example, although Han received secret intelligence about Jin weaknesses and heard sage counsel from an anonymous *jinsshi* holder, he failed to effectively use such assistance.³¹ On occasion, Han inspired ridicule, as seen in a poem mocking Han's construction of an ersatz Tao Qian-like village on a hill overlooking the capital's West Lake.³² Luo remembered Han most for the disastrous 1206-1208 war, faulting his deplorable preparation but lamenting too his grisly end at the hands of the Song court, which had him executed and then delivered his head to the Jin.

We can make an analogy with a family's sons and grandsons, whose grandfather or father had been killed by others, and their house and land had been seized by others. There is a crazy servant helping them take vengeance. His plans are sloppy, his calculations superficial, and he is unsuccessful in the end. Is it then acceptable to put the blame on this servant and send him to the enemy to let them do with him as they please?

譬如人家子孫，其祖父為人所殺，其田宅為人所吞，有一狂僕佐之復讎，謀疎計淺，迄不能遂，乃歸罪此僕，送之讎人，使之甘心焉，可乎哉？³³

Although the observation goes unsaid, the abortive campaign might well have been appeared to Luo and other men in the 1240s as the last opportunity for the Southern Song to recapture the Central Plain. Like Qin, Han failed to reunify the empire, but the problem lay not with his disloyalty but his incompetence.

³⁰ Luo and an associate exchanged verses lamenting Zhao Ruyi's 趙汝愚 (1140-1196) refusal to give Han a position after the latter's assistance in managing Guangzong's abdication and Ningzong's 寧宗 (r. 1195-1224) accession to the throne in 1195. The slight fueled Han's resentment and ambition, and prompted him to dismiss his foes. Ibid., *bing bian*, *juan* 6, p. 340.

³¹ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 62-63; *yi bian*, *juan* 2, pp. 139-140.

³² Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 3, p. 165.

³³ Ibid., *juan* 2, p. 147. Importantly, biographies of men responsible for Han's beheading frequently passed over their role in the affair. See Fang Cheng-hua, "Fuchou dayi yu Nansong houqi dui wai zhengce de zhuanbian," pp. 319, 328.

3.2 Military Malfeasance and Mediocrity

Nefarious ministers aside, the Southern Song had often fallen victim to military ineptitude and perfidy, as the court for years struggled both with Jin armies and its own generals and soldiers. Pride of place among these episodes of insubordination went to the 1137 Huaixi 淮西 revolt, in which commander Li Qiong 酈瓊 (1104-1153) killed his superior and defected with his 30,000 troops to the puppet state of Great Qi 大齊.³⁴ In Luo's account, he notes that the troops, under the overall control of Liu Guangshi 劉光世 (1089-1142), "lacked discipline" 無紀律, but that Liu "understood the army's mind" 得軍心.³⁵ Lü Zhi 呂祉 (1092-1137), Liu's replacement, imposed a stricter regimen, and his effort backfired disastrously, leading to his own death.³⁶ Indeed, in Luo's diatribe against Qin Gui, he mentions that headstrong generals named their armies after themselves, such as "the Zhang family army" or "the Han family army," which, perhaps unwittingly, supported Qin's case that Gaozong 高宗 (r. 1127-1162) needed most to bring his own commanders to heel.³⁷ Turning to more recent times, Luo cited the ill-starred mission of Xu Guo 許國 (?-1225) to the camp of the Shandong rebel Li Quan 李全 (?-1231). Xu, a military man who recently had received a civilian post, behaved arrogantly on his assignment, and Li's troops consequently executed him. The debacle prompted Luo to quote at length Qiao Xingjian's 喬行簡 (1156-1241) earlier memorial protesting Xu's appointment, listing the illustrious civil officials who had held military office and insisting on the civilian staffing of sensitive frontier posts.³⁸

³⁴ In Tao Jing-shen's view, this calamity turned Gaozong's focus from recovering the occupied Central Plain to imposing control over his armed forces. See Tao Jing-shen, "The Move to the South and the Reign of Kao-tsung (1127-1162)," in Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 5, part 1: *The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907-1279* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 676.

³⁵ *Helin, jia bian, juan 2*, p. 28.

³⁶ In Luo's hands, the revolt serves mainly as the *mise-en-scene* for another incident, as will be seen later. Liu Guangshi rewarded generously Li Qiong's battlefield successes and ignored his forces' lawlessness and violence. See *JYYL*, vol. 3, *juan 111*, p. 1800. His replacement, in fact, was Wang De 王德 (1088-1155), not Lü Zhi, who was Wang's subordinate. Wang and Li earlier were on bad terms. Lü later secretly memorialized that Li be relieved of his command, which sparked the mutiny.

³⁷ *Helin, jia bian, juan 5*, p. 79.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, *juan 4*, pp. 66-67.

In general, Luo charged Song commanders with careerism, brutality, and fecklessness. Their deplorable performance, not foreigners or bandits, had put the dynasty in peril. Consequently, the Song army distinguished itself mainly through its waste and ineffectiveness, and Luo noted how local militias on occasion resisted the enemy with greater courage and success.³⁹ These current woes prompted Luo in several entries to cite Du Fu's verse, which decried similar circumstances nearly half a millennium earlier.⁴⁰ The parallels, strictly speaking, were inexact; China in the 1240s appears serene when compared to the turmoil in which Du lived. As a rhetorical move, however, Luo's exaggeration implied that stability would not last long, and that contemporaries might well witness a return of chaos and carnage.

3.3 A Pervasive Lassitude

The ills of court officials and a malfunctioning military were part of a more widespread decline of civilization. Recent centuries were replete with scenes of savagery and selfishness. Ambitious men in recent times "incited rebellions, reaped calamities, deceived lords, wronged countries, killed people, and destroyed things, in the hope of achievements and rewards" 激變稔禍，欺君誤國，殺人害物，以希功賞。⁴¹ Would-be "gentlemen" 君子, in Luo's view, "from youth to old age coveted glory and craved profit, like moths hastening to a flame, snails climbing a wall, or flies pursuing a stench" 自少至老，貪榮嗜利如飛蛾之赴燭，蝸牛之升壁，青蠅之逐臭。⁴² To these general

³⁹ Ibid., *juan* 1, p. 10. That being said, Luo opposed a military draft, citing Du Fu's famous "Recruiting Officer at Shih-hao Village" (*Shihaoli* 石壕吏) and quoting in full Mei Yaochen's 梅堯臣 (1002-1060) well-known "A Farmer's Family" (*Tianjia* 田家) and "The Poor Girl at the Ju River Bank" (*Rufen pinnü* 汝墳貧女). For the first work, see Du Fu, *Dushi xiangzhu* 杜詩詳注, commentated by Qiu Zhao'ao 仇兆鰲, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), *juan* 7, pp. 528-530. For the latter two poems, see Mei Yaochen, *Mei Yaochen ji biannian jiaozhu* 梅堯臣集編年校注, commentated by Zhu Dongrun 朱東潤, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1980), *juan* 10, pp. 164-166. For an English translation of Du's work, see Cyril Birch (ed.), *Anthology of Chinese Literature*, vol. 1: *From Early Times to the Fourteenth Century* (New York: Grove Press, 1965), pp. 239-240. For English translations of Mei's works, see Jonathan Chaves, *Mei Yao-ch'en and the Development of Early Sung Poetry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 164-165, 166-167.

⁴⁰ *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 3, pp. 168, 175-176; *bing bian*, *juan* 5, p. 318.

⁴¹ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, p. 189.

⁴² Ibid., *juan* 5, p. 204.

jeremiads Luo added more specific juxtapositions, which contrasted the strictness of the Tang with the laxity of the Song. Du Fu's views notwithstanding, Tang armies fought better than Song armies.⁴³ Brazen and disloyal officials in medieval dynasties met with demotion or execution, while their Song counterparts went scot-free.⁴⁴ In the Five Dynasties, normative hierarchies had dissolved, as soldiers had begun to bully generals and clerks to bully officials, and these habits had persisted.⁴⁵ To clinch his point that Song men, whatever their moral worth, did not or could not adhere to the Way or follow ritual, Luo cited Wang Anshi himself, adding that ethical standards had slipped further since Wang's times.⁴⁶

The late Southern Song, however, presented a paradox. If the dynasty had fallen victim to the misdeeds of bad ministers and generals, so had contemporaries presumably benefited from the immeasurable contributions of Zhu Xi, Lü Zuqian, Lu Jiuyuan, and other members of the *daoxue* pantheon. These luminaries had corrected their predecessors' errors and "had fathomed and explained the Way, and illuminated principle" 窮而講道明理.⁴⁷ Their commentaries on the Confucian canon had become state orthodoxy, and offerings to their spirits were part of the official ritual program. Recent decades had seen illustrious successors such as Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 (1178-1235) and Wei Liaoweng 魏了翁 (1178-1237), admired as paragons of moral excellence and classical learning.⁴⁸

This illustrious recent intellectual history, however, had failed to turn the tide. Examining an observation, attributed to Zhu Xi, that sages and worthies necessarily were

⁴³ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 1, p. 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid., *juan* 2, pp. 26-27; *juan* 5, pp. 78-79. In the latter case, Luo cited with approval Empress Wu Zetian's 武則天 (r. 690-704) demotion of the suspect descendants of the Sui official Yang Su 楊素 (544-606). As Luo put it, "[Wu] Zetian was a female ruler, yet she still understood evil and demoted them" 則天一女主，尚知惡而貶之. Ibid., *juan* 5, p. 79. Such justice was missing in the twelfth century, when Qin Gui and his wife went unpunished.

⁴⁵ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, p. 192.

⁴⁶ Ibid., *juan* 3, p. 165. Luo referred to Wang's essay, "Explanation of the Mandate" (*Mingjie* 命解), paraphrasing it in places. See Wang Anshi, *Wang Wengong wenji* 王文公文集, annot. Tang Wubiao 唐武標, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974), *juan* 27, p. 318.

⁴⁷ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 5, p. 89.

⁴⁸ Luo praised Zhen for condemning the poetry that lacked an upright spirit and records how Changsha natives erected a living shrine on Zhen's behalf. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 193-194, 192-193.

heroes, Luo returned to Zhen and Wei.⁴⁹ In the case of Zhen, although no one gainsaid his moral qualities, some questioned his administrative fitness for higher bureaucratic levels. In Wei's case, Luo recounted in detail how entertainers at the capital had savagely mocked him, finding his scholarship useless. The authorities had the irreverent artists tattooed, but Luo concluded that Confucians ought to take the incident as a warning (*jie* 戒), presumably to the effect that commoners sometimes did not share their esteem for eminent (but ineffectual) scholar-officials.⁵⁰ More seriously, the adoption of the *daoxue* curriculum still had not restored learned culture:

In sum, when it comes to the present day, literati only speak of Yao, Shun, King Wen, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius. They only read the *Analects*, *Mencius*, *Doctrine of the Mean*, and *Great Learning*. Their speech invariably praises Zhou [Dunyi], the Cheng [brothers], Zhang [Zai], and Zhu [Xi]. Their studies invariably say, "Extend knowledge and investigate things." There has not been anything like it since the Three Ages. It can be said to be so prosperous! Yet heroic literati do not emerge, and the customs of ritual and righteousness do not prevail. Literati mores become more vulgar by the day, and human talent declines every year. So with the explanations in the schools and the discussions of Confucians—it is almost like butchers honoring the Buddha with ritual obeisance and courtesans reciting the *Rites*. This can be sighed over.

蓋至于今，士非堯、舜、文王、周、孔不談，非《語》、《孟》、《中庸》、《大學》不觀，言必稱周、程、張、朱，學必曰「致知格物」，此自三代而後所未有也，可謂盛矣。然豪傑之士不出，禮義之俗不成，士風日陋於一日，人才歲衰於一歲，而學校之所講，逢掖之所談，幾有若屠兒之禮佛，娼家之讀禮者，是可歎也。⁵¹

⁴⁹ Zhu reputedly remarked, "There have been heroes who were not sages and worthies; there never have been sages and worthies who were not heroes" 豪傑而不聖賢者有矣，未有聖賢而不豪傑者也. *Ibid.*, *bing bian*, *juan* 3, p. 278. I have not been able to find the source of Zhu's comment.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, *juan* 5, p. 314. Li Xinchuan, as well as Lü Zhi, also bemoaned opportunists who used *daoxue* as a

Thus, although *daoxue*'s adherents had established intellectual hegemony, their ultimate goal of transformation through education remained well beyond reach. Luo expressed his disappointment in an entry bemoaning the widespread use of lightweight, convenient, foreign clothes. In his view, this preference for uncanonical wear to mean that restoration of the Way would not happen in the foreseeable future.⁵² Small wonder that he charged most literati with losing their integrity and being "traitors to our Confucius" (*wu fuzi zhi zuiren* 吾夫子之罪人).⁵³

4. Necessary Virtues and Remarkable Individuals

Despite these ills, other entries in *Helin yulu* would give Song readers cause for hope and inspiration. When examined together, these uplifting accounts portrayed three basic virtues: dynastic loyalty, courage, and austerity. These characteristics often overlapped, exemplified by a single individual. Tellingly, most cases related people from the Southern Song, suggesting that although the sages were distant, the recent past (and by extension, the present) had their outstanding men and women. Three figures in particular recur in Luo Dajing's work: Hu Quan 胡銓 (1102-1180), Zhang Jun 張浚 (1097-1164), and Yang Wanli. All three men pushed vigorously for recovery of the occupied Central Plain, experienced great frustration (and sometimes prolonged exile) in their professional lives, and defied prevailing views and customs with awesome rectitude. One speculates that Luo, who never rose even into the middling bureaucratic ranks, identified with these illustrious but thwarted figures. In addition, Luo's gallery of heroes included a broad range of social types, and his troubled era and career difficulties might have readied him to appreciate worthy behavior wherever he found it.

political weapon and to further their own careers. See Charles Hartman, "Li Hsin-ch'uan and the Historical Image of Late Sung *Tao-hsüeh*," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 61.2 (2001), pp. 333-336, 358.

⁵² *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 1, pp. 120-121.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, *bing bian*, *juan* 4, p. 303. In this respect, Luo Dajing joined with Lu You 陸游 (1125-1210) and Wei Liaoweng in their caustic views of Southern Song literati.

4.1 Dynastic Loyalty

No quality won more honor than devotion to the Song ruling house. As noted above, Du Fu's steadfast concern for his lord deeply resonated with Luo. Like the post-755 Tang state, the Southern Song faced challenges from its generals and armies for decades and could not take for granted its subjects' fealty. Unlike the Tang case, the Song "restoration" fell short, as the court never returned to its original capital. Committed, perhaps, to extol the "next best thing," Luo in one entry detailed at length the extraordinary ritual veneration lavished on imperial images spirited away south in 1127, declaring that such care for royal spirits was unprecedented in history.⁵⁴ Joining this institutionalized devotion were examples of individual officials' loyalty. When Zhang Jun, exiled to Sichuan, had his letters searched by Qin Gui's agents, they found mostly "words of worry for the dynasty and love of the lord" 憂國愛君之語.⁵⁵ Most dramatic was the martyrdom of the Qizhou 蘄州 prefect Li Chengzhi 李誠之 (?-1221). As Jin troops were about to overrun the prefectural seat, Li ordered his entire household killed and then committed suicide rather than surrender.⁵⁶ In such accounts of dedication and sacrifice, one suspects, Luo wished that his readers would find encouragement for the future.

Several entries demonstrate the commitment of commoners, who could not expect the substantial rewards granted officials. For example, during the 1129 Miao-Liu 苗劉 mutiny, the plotters sent an assassin to murder Zhang Jun, then mobilizing forces to quash the uprising. The would-be executioner evaded guards and found Zhang alone at night. Rather than killing Zhang, he praised Zhang's loyalty and righteousness, alerted him that his defenders were unreliable, and refused Zhang's offers of money and position.⁵⁷ Another late twelfth-century case of dynastic allegiance involved a Han Chinese living under Jurchen rule. Violating dynastic law, the man secretly met a Song envoy at a post station at night and divulged Jin weaknesses. Luo termed him "a righteous gentleman of the Central Plain, who did not forget the blessings bestowed by the [Song] dynasty" 此必

⁵⁴ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 5, p. 199. Luo cites too the 1234 expedition to conduct rites at the imperial graves near Kaifeng, after the Jin collapse, but is silent on the military debacle that ensued.

⁵⁵ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 1, p. 5.

⁵⁶ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 5, p. 207.

⁵⁷ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 3, pp. 45-46. The account appears also in Tuotuo 脫脫 et al. (eds.), *Songshi* 宋史, vol. 32 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), *juan* 361, pp. 11299-11300.

中原義士，不忘國家涵濡之澤。⁵⁸ Literally taken, his assertion exaggerated things, because the Song had lost control over the north over sixty years earlier, and few alive would have memories of its rule. These details aside, the account illustrated that Han Chinese in occupied territory were willing to undergo great risk to show that they considered themselves still Song subjects and awaited the dynasty's return.

Furthermore, dynastic loyalty transcended gender and even species. Tales of women's political steadfastness frequently involved physical peril and self-sacrifice, but Luo's most striking account works very differently. In his entry concerning the Song general Han Shizhong 韓世忠 (1089-1151) and his courtesan wife, Luo notes Han had trapped the Jin general Wuzhu's 兀朮 (aka. Wanyan Zongbi 完顏宗弼, ?-1148) forces at Huangtiandang 黃天蕩, but the latter managed to escape north. The wife, enraged at her husband's failure, memorialized that her husband be punished.⁵⁹ A final example told of two animals, which had amused Tang courts but later fell into the possession of rebels and usurpers. The first case involved one of Tang Xuanzong's 唐玄宗 (r. 712-755) famous dancing horses. At a rebel banquet, the animal fell into its familiar routine when the music began. The second was a monkey, kept by Tang Zhaozong 唐昭宗 (r. 889-904) and usually dressed in entertainer's clothes. When taken to the court of Zhu Wen 朱溫 (852-912), who had deposed the ruling Tang family, it howled and ripped its clothes. Both animals were killed, but Luo drew a distinction between the horse's submission and the monkey's defiance, concluding, "Minghuang's horse would have been put to shame by Zhaozong's monkey" 明皇之馬，有愧於昭宗之猴。⁶⁰ Staying true to one's sovereign in these accounts became a universal expectation.

4.2 Courage and Composure

As some stories attest, serving the dynasty demanded other qualities, and courage ranked at the top. Brave men and women did more than follow orders; they often put themselves in peril for the greater good. In one entry, Luo recounted how Feng Choufu

⁵⁸ *Helin, jia bian, juan 4*, pp. 62-63.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, *bing bian, juan 2*, p. 266. Luo commented, "Her wisdom and greatness were like this" 其明智英偉如此。See also Beverly J. Bossler, *Courtesans, Concubines, and the Cult of Female Fidelity: Gender and Social Change in China, 1000-1400* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), p. 205.

⁶⁰ *Helin, jia bian, juan 6*, p. 110.

逢丑父 (fl. 589 B.C.) and Ji Xin 紀信 (?-204 B.C.), in the heat of desperate combat, took the initiative to impersonate their lords and face certain death, in order to enable their lords' escape.⁶¹ In another item, Luo virtually insisted on the necessity of fearlessness, as he condemned Zhao Ding's 趙鼎 (1085-1147) 1132 war plans that devised an escape route for Song armies before their engagement with Jin forces. Zhao's prudence, Luo admitted, might have its place, because plans included Gaozong's personal participation. Nonetheless, as Xiang Yu's 項羽 (?-202 B.C.) dramatic victory at Julu 鉅鹿 had testified, only troops with no choice but victory or death could bring about success.⁶²

Among Southern Song displays of bravery, none surpassed Hu Quan. As is well known, Hu in late 1138 sent a memorial that excoriated the Southern Song-Jin peace agreement, and requested the execution of Qin Gui and Song envoys.⁶³ This well-circulated attack on high officials and state policy infuriated the court, landed Hu in exile for seventeen years, and ignited Qin's persecution of critics that ceased only with his death. Hu's defiance made him a martyr for later generations. Luo and his readers knew this history well, prompting him perhaps to highlight another episode in Hu's life, when he was a government student and lived near the Luling 廬陵 (Jiangxi) prefectural seat. As Jin armies crossed the Yangtze, the Empress Dowager took refuge there, the prefect fled his post, and local riffraff rioted in the streets. On his own initiative, Hu led his militia to Luling. He executed the scofflaws, denounced the prefect's cowardice, and recruited teams to retrieve him. The court dispatched a new governor, who dared not enter the city until Hu disbanded his militia and walked home.⁶⁴ This tale presaged three aspects of Hu's later career. The first, mentioned by Luo, was his courage, but one might also add Hu's penchant for drastic action, as well as his conflict with two sorts of enemies:

⁶¹ Ibid., *juan* 1, p. 5. For Feng Choufu, see Ruan Yuan (ed.), *Chunqiu zuozhuan zhushu* 春秋左傳注疏, annot. Lu Xuanxun, *Chongkan Songben shisanjing zhushu fu jiaokanji*, vol. 6, *juan* 25, pp. 424a-424b; Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg (trans.), *Zuo Tradition/Zuozhuan: Commentary on the "Spring and Autumn Annals"* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), p. 719. For Ji Xin, see Sima Qian 司馬遷, *Shiji* 史記, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), *juan* 7, p. 326.

⁶² *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 6, p. 107. As is well known, Xiang's troops broke their bowls and sank their boats to ensure that they fought with complete desperation. Sima Qian, *Shiji*, vol. 1, *juan* 7, p. 307.

⁶³ For more on this affair, see Hilde de Weerd, *Information, Territory, and Networks*, pp. 415-419.

⁶⁴ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 3, p. 54.

violent men in the field and cowards in the government.

Luo also celebrated Hu's supporters who defied Qin's inquisition. For example, Gao Deng 高登 (?-1148), magistrate of Guxian 古縣 county (Guangdong) refused to build a shrine for Qin Gui's father, who earlier had served there.⁶⁵ His superiors jailed Gao but proved unable to accuse him of any crime. Later, Gao served in Guishan 歸善 county (Guangdong). His duties comprised devising questions for county examination candidates, and Gao used this routine exercise to focus on political failures, which implicitly took the court to task.⁶⁶ An enraged Qin Gui had Gao degraded to commoner status and banished to Rongzhou 容州 (Guangdong). The same fate met Wu Yuanmei 吳元美 (*jinshi* 1124), whom Qin and his allies judged guilty of composing a subversive if recondite rhapsody. Wu also had named his studio Retiree of Shang Hall (*Shangyin tang* 商隱堂), which the court viewed as insulting.⁶⁷ The government restored Wu's office posthumously, but Gao, despite Zhu Xi's petition, did not receive official rehabilitation.⁶⁸ In Rongzhou, Luo constructed a shrine for both men at the local school, paying tribute to their valor and participating in the virtuous opposition to Qin and his misrule.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Ibid., *juan* 6, pp. 102-103. For Gao's biography, see Tuotuo et al. (eds.), *Songshi*, vol. 35, *juan* 399, pp. 12128-12132.

⁶⁶ Specifically, the poetry topic (*fu* 賦) concerned the fecklessness of high officials, the discussion section (*lun* 論) cited how honest criticism went unheeded, and the policy question (*ce* 策) referred to recent floods.

⁶⁷ For an analysis of how Gaozong and Qin Gui construed Wu's works, see Charles Hartman, "The Misfortunes of Poetry: Literary Inquisitions under Ch'in Kuei (1090-1155)," *Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews*, 25 (2003), pp. 33-34. I would only add that the hall's name could also be punned as "Esteeming Retirement," or *shangyin* 尚隱.

⁶⁸ See "Qi baolu Gao Deng zhuan 乞褒錄高登傳" in Zhu Xi 朱熹, *Zhu Xi ji* 朱熹集, annotated by Guo Qi 郭齊 and Yin Bo 尹波, vol. 2 (Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), *juan* 19, pp. 789-790. Zhu also commemorated another shrine for Gao, which lacks the test question details found in Luo's entry. See "Zhangzhou zhouxue Dongxi xiansheng Gao gong ci ji 漳州州學東溪先生高公祠記." Ibid., vol. 7, *juan* 79, pp. 4124-4126.

⁶⁹ Other figures included Wang Tinggui 王庭珪 (1080-1172) and Chen Gangzhong 陳剛中 (*jinshi* 1128), who sent off Hu into his exile with verse and a greeting *qi* 啟, respectively. Their works, quoted at length by Luo, juxtaposed Hu's integrity with Qin's pettiness and cowardice. Their boldness won them prolonged exile. See *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 3, p. 47. For an analysis of Wang's work, see Charles Hartman, "The Misfortunes of Poetry," pp. 47-49.

4.3 A Taste for the Strenuous

Seen otherwise, these feats of dynastic loyalty and courage demanded extraordinary sacrifice and self-control. Other notables in *Helin yulu* exhibited such virtues in everyday life. Their austerity set them apart from their pleasure-seeking, greedy, indolent peers, although Luo did not belabor the contrast. Among the most basic of these “good” traits were diligence and self-discipline, embodied by Song Gaozong. An official urged the emperor to read the “Annals of Han Guangwu” (*Guangwu ji* 光武紀), presumably to provide insight and inspiration for dynastic restoration. To better master the text, Gaozong instead personally copied out the whole work, winning Luo’s admiration for his perseverance.⁷⁰ Other elite paragons included Yang Shi 楊時 (1053-1135) and Zhang Shangying 張商英 (1043-1121), renowned for their habits of unceasing study. Significantly, Luo said nothing about the content or fruits of their industry but chose to highlight their physical self-discipline.⁷¹

Committed book study, however, drew less space from Luo than did tales of hard-working households. These exempla featured the communal family of Lu Jiuyuan. Luo portrayed at length this large, multi-generation lineage, noting its property management structure and highlighting its daily ritual program, which marked the Lus as a kin group dominated by work and duty.⁷² As for models of individual industry, pride of place went to Yang Wanli’s wife. Well after she turned seventy, she cooked breakfast on winter mornings for the servants. Her son, Yang Changru, protested that her age was advanced and the chores demeaning, but she responded with anger and insults. In addition, she personally cultivated ramie, made thread, and wove clothes into her old age. She nursed all of her seven children, scorning the option of wet nurses: “To make others’ children go hungry to feed our children—what kind of idea truly is that?” 飢人之子，以哺吾子，是誠何心哉。⁷³ Her example, we are told, left a deep impression on Yang Changru, as well as moving Luo to pair her with Jing Jiang 敬姜 from the *Lienü zhuan* 列女傳 and

⁷⁰ *Helin, jia bian*, juan 1, p. 3.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁷² *Ibid.*, *bing bian*, juan 5, pp. 323-324. The entry is translated in large part in Joseph P. McDermott, *The Making of a New Rural Order in South China*, vol. 1: *Village, Land, and Lineage in Huizhou, 900-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 165-166.

⁷³ *Helin, bing bian*, juan 4, p. 309.

cite at length the Han text.⁷⁴ Finally, although breast-feeding and copying texts might lie at opposite ends of the Confucian hierarchy of labor, both activities displayed an exceptional spirit of self-reliance.

Other entries extolled figures who proved indifferent to the material comforts and rewards. Avatars of the former ideal, such as Yi Yin, Fan Li, Lu Zhonglian 魯仲連 (305 B.C.-245 B.C.), Zhang Liang 張良 (251 B.C.-186 B.C.), and Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234) rejected the state's largesse and retired in obscurity.⁷⁵ In later centuries, Luo noted, few followed their ways, and most powerful men would do anything to gain wealth and honor from the government. Exceptions could be found, however, and one entry recounted scholar-officials distinguished for their strict adherence to lean budgets and bland diets.⁷⁶ Qiu Yu 仇愈 (fl. early twelfth century), for example, consumed only vegetables. Hearing that one of his staff officers occasionally ate meat, Chou retorted, "Your excellency is a minor official yet dares to eat meat. [You] certainly are no upright gentleman" 公為小官，乃敢食肉，定非廉士。⁷⁷ In a similar vein, the government salaries earned by Yang Wanli and Yang Changru tempted neither man toward extravagance. The Yang family home had earthen steps and unworked timbers, so impressing the local magistrate that he inspected the residence and ordered a chart be made to serve as a model. Yang Changru on his deathbed, we are told, lacked even the funds to purchase his own burial clothes or shroud. Both father and son were men "pure and detached from contemporary customs" 清介絕俗。⁷⁸ This simplicity, Luo concluded, would enable preserve their integrity and enhance their longevity.

Finally, along with frugality and diligence, Luo offered cases of sublime modesty. Humility, of course, ranked among the most important traits expected of the Confucian gentleman and, apart from extraordinary acts of filial piety, did not ordinarily provide fertile ground for the memorable incidents found in miscellanies. In *Helin yulu*, however, modesty at times becomes the source for uncommon or even heroic acts of self-

⁷⁴ For an English translation of this biography, see Anne Behnke Kinney (ed.), *Exemplary Women of Early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), pp. 13-14.

⁷⁵ *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 188-189; *juan* 5, pp. 203-204.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209. These stalwarts included Li Ruogu 李若谷 (fl. mid-eleventh century), Zhang Shangying, Zheng Gangzhong 鄭剛中 (1088-1154), as well as Su Shi, while in exile.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* I take the use of "your excellency" to be sarcastic.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, *bing bian*, *juan* 4, p. 309.

abnegation. To return to Yang Changru, his performance as Huzhou 湖州 prefect inspired residents to construct in his honor a living shrine (*shengci* 生祠), which contained his portrait. The tribute displeased Yang. He asked for the painting, wrote a poem on it, and then rolled it up to take away to his next post. The verse first noted his aged appearance and then decreed, “Let us further not leave behind any traces/ Why discard the old or the present?” 更莫留形迹，何曾廢古今。One speculates that Yang felt uneasy at the prospect of his “traces” being honored and worshiped.⁷⁹ On a very different occasion, the fastidious student Yang Bangyi 楊邦乂 (1086-1129), invited to relax at a friend’s home, found out after a few rounds of wine that his classmates had actually lured him into a brothel. Mortified, Yang fled the scene and, once home, castigated himself in tears and burned his scholar’s cap and robe.⁸⁰ Self-denial reached its apogee in Luo’s collection with an account of Chen Shidao 陳師道 (1053-1102). Chen’s duties required him to attend the winter suburban sacrifices in Kaifeng, but he possessed only a single quilt to keep warm.⁸¹ Although his wife obtained a second blanket from her sister, Chen rejected her offer, explaining that he never wore others’ garments. Eventually, Chen took sick in the cold and died. For Luo, Chen’s self-renunciation called to mind the unsurpassable immaculate “whiteness,” attributed to Confucius.⁸²

For readers of *Helin yulu*, these cases of faithfulness, bravery, and austerity served as powerful counter-exempla to the dispiriting failures examined earlier. To emphasize further, these admirable individuals distinguished themselves not so much by their learning, benevolence, or ritual correctness as by their willingness to expose their bodies to physical discomfort and peril. While Luo drew his heroes chiefly from the Song, most came from the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as if to suggest that such valor and sacrifice in the recent past and the present had grown scarce.

⁷⁹ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 1, pp. 130-131.

⁸⁰ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 3, p. 54.

⁸¹ Ibid., *bing bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 302-303.

⁸² Ruan Yuan (ed.), *Mengzi zhushu* 孟子注疏, annot. Lu Xuanxun, *Chongkan Songben shisanjing zhushu fu jiaokanji*, vol. 8, *juan* 5 *xia*, p. 98b.

5. How the World Works

Helin yulu, however, offered more than commendable and deplorable examples; the entries, considered together, composed a vision of a violent, unpredictable world and implicitly urged how literati readers might cope. While the anthology has its samples of refined conversation, its contents frequently touch on war tactics, battlefield combat, and assassination conspiracies. When Luo refers to memorable incidents and works from the Tang, his attention often turns to Du Fu's war poetry, noted above, and anecdotes that relate the punitive ways of Empress Wu.⁸³ In one twelfth-century tale, a Song commoner, passing by literati discussing Du Fu, heard one critic exclaim, "Du Shaoling could be killed!" 杜少陵可殺.⁸⁴ Alarmed, the man told others of the plot and asked the identity of Shaoling. Although his ignorance became the object of scholarly delight and ridicule, Luo Dajing refused to join their condescension. He cited the executions of Yang Xiu 楊修 (175-219) and Xue Daocheng 薛道衡 (540-609), reminding readers that political murder was a fact of life and that the supposed dolt had grounds for worry. Another tale, pieced from different informants and Luo himself, detailed a chain of animal killing. A snake devoured frogs, a centipede destroyed a snake from inside its stomach, and then the centipede met its demise when a spider urinated on it, reducing its flesh to something resembling "king crab meat" (*houjiang* 鱗醬).⁸⁵ Many miscellanies praise animals for their moral, even inspiring behavior, but animals face here constant insecurity, taking their turns as hunters and hunted. This savagery underscored for Luo Dajing life's unpredictability, as he noted that the larger animals never anticipated their defeat at the hands of smaller adversaries, demonstrating that size did not ensure success.

Small wonder, then, that Luo commended men who prepared for the worst. Their like included Yang Wanli. During his service at the capital, Yang kept his money locked in his sleeping chambers and forbade his household to buy goods in the market, lest such

⁸³ For the latter category, see *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 4, p. 60; *juan* 5, pp. 78-79; *yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 195-196; *juan* 6, p. 224.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, *bing bian*, *juan* 2, pp. 266-267.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, *yi bian*, *juan* 2, pp. 144-145.

possessions burden them on their way home to Jiangxi. According to Luo, Yang “every day resembled someone hurrying to pack up” 日日若促裝者.⁸⁶ Yang’s appreciation of the precariousness of political position echoed that of an unnamed capital governor, who came to his position without his family and apparently kept no servants. Before going to work each day, he packed his one small bag and placed it in front of the hall, “usually resembling a guest at an inn about to go” 常若逆旅人將行者.⁸⁷ Such precautions, we are told, allowed him to prosecute the powerful and resist the eunuchs without fear. In a climate pervaded by insecurity and punctuated by disaster, these defensive measures were necessary. Indeed, a year after publishing this entry, Luo himself lost his post, solely due to his association with the defeated side in a court struggle.

Sensible departure plans aside, *Helin yulu* tacitly prescribed two approaches to cope with worldly affairs. As might be expected in a self-conscious Confucian’s miscellany, many entries stressed benevolence, as attested in the discussion that began this article and reflected elsewhere in two ways. First, virtuous leaders governed with a light touch, reluctant to employ force. In high antiquity, Luo noted that Shun 舜 executed (only) four people and the Duke Zhou two, exhibiting a restraint that contrasted markedly with later ages.⁸⁸ As for Song examples of benevolent prudence, Fan Zhongyan belonged at the top of Luo’s list. First, in 1041 after battles with Xi Xia forces had left Song troops dispirited, Fan argued for a cautious, defensive stance. Han Qi’s aggressive proposal, however, won court approval and then resulted in catastrophic military defeat at Haoshuichuan 好水川.⁸⁹ Second, the prefect Chao Zhongyue 晁仲約 (fl. 1043), faced with marauding bandits in 1043, chose to feed them rather than fight them, and so spared commoners from slaughter. Fu Bi 富弼 (1004-1083) demanded Chao’s execution, but Fan rejected

⁸⁶ Ibid., *juan* 1, p. 133.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 5, pp. 85-86.

⁸⁹ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 2, pp. 151-152. The main source is Li Tao 李燾, *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, annotated by Shanghai shifan daxue guji zhengli yanjiusuo 上海師範大學古籍整理研究所 and Huadong shifan daxue guji zhengli yanjiusuo 華東師範大學古籍整理研究所, vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), *juan* 131, pp. 3093-3102, although Luo quotes *Dongxuan bilu* 東軒筆錄 as his source. See Wei Tai 魏泰, *Dongxuan bilu*, annot. Li Yumin 李裕民, *Tang Song shiliao biji congkan* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), *juan* 7, p. 82. For a summary of the event, see Michael McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-tsung (1022-1063) and Ying-tsung (1063-1067),” in Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 5, part 1, pp. 308-309.

the request, inspiring a poem two centuries later from Luo.⁹⁰ In the same forgiving spirit, Gaozong and Lü Yihao 呂頤浩 (1071-1139) denied Yuan Zhi's 袁植 (?-1129) request for the execution of the incompetent (but once indispensable) grand councilor Huang Qianshan 黃潛善 (1078-1130). Despite Huang's mistakes, his slaying would endanger the dynasty's mandate and weaken domestic harmony when the nation faced mortal peril.⁹¹ These acts of forbearance won Luo's approval, because they established critical limits on the punishment of otherwise disgraced officials. Huang's execution, Luo suggested, would have set a dangerous precedent and allowed Qin Gui later to destroy his opponents with far deadlier results. Even in dire circumstances, the pursuit of moral excellence never could be dispensed with.

Of course, benevolence meant more than preventing bloodshed, and *Helin yulu* highlighted the importance of generosity. In a Mencian vein, Luo assigned top priority to tangible, physical well-being, declaring, "In methods for blessing the people, nothing is better than the ever-normal granaries" 惠民之法，莫善於常平。⁹² This state institution designed to save commoners from starvation assumed such significance for Luo that he insisted, citing Sima Guang and Chen Fuliang 陳傅良 (1137-1203), that its origins lay in the venerated Three Ages rather than the more recent and complex Han dynasty.⁹³ In recent times, the Southern Song court displayed its munificence in its abolition of wartime levies, which Luo found responsible for the Song's successful restoration, and in Xiaozong's 孝宗 (r. 1162-1189) refusal to tax shifting, impermanent riparian farmland. In the latter case, the emperor scolded the policy's sponsor, saying, "Even if we were to chop you into myriad parts, how could it stop the criticism?" 雖斬汝萬段，豈足塞責。⁹⁴

⁹⁰ *Helin, jia bian, juan 5*, p. 81; *yi bian, juan 2*, p. 152. For the latter incident, see Li Tao, *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian*, vol. 6, *juan 145-146*, pp. 3499-3550. Li Tao does not identify the bandit, but notes that other sources have named him as Zhang Hai 張海, as does Luo. Li doubts this attribution, since Zhang's depredations occurred in another part of the country. Conversely, Luo took Zhuge Liang to task for his execution of Ma Su 馬謖, charging Zhuge with studying Legalist approaches. *Helin, jia bian, juan 4*, p. 68.

⁹¹ *JYYL*, vol. 1, *juan 24*, pp. 497-498. Luo adds that Fu and Yuan received demotions as a result of their proposals.

⁹² *Helin, jia bian, juan 3*, p. 55.

⁹³ I have been unable to find the provenance of Sima Guang's assertion. Chen Fuliang's assertion appears in "Yu Wang Dexiu shu 與王德脩書." See Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin (eds.), *Quan Song wen*, vol. 267, *juan 6034*, p. 334.

⁹⁴ *Helin, yi bian, juan 1*, pp. 127-128; *jia bian, juan 6*, p. 114. In the former case, modern scholars would

The chastised official, we are told, broke into a sweat and bared his head as he apologized. Thus, even in the exercise of benevolent rule, the era's violence left its mark on political discourse.⁹⁵

Virtue and liberality alone, though, could not order the world, and many entries salute people and acts of unusual intelligence. By this quality, Luo referred especially to skillful responses to difficult situations. As he put it,

In general, when handling affairs, whether they be great or small, everyone most honors wisdom. What is wisdom? It is responding to changes and adapting to the situation in adequate fashion to stop calamities and relieve troubles, and that is it.

大凡臨事無大小，皆貴乎智。智者何？隨機應變，足以弭患濟事者是也。⁹⁶

Of course, as attested by the *Book of Changes* 易經 and its commentaries, Confucians were mindful of the necessity for constant adjustments to a world in flux. The issue resonated with one of Mencius's better-known passages, in which the philosopher excused forbidden physical contact between the sexes if the action saved human life.⁹⁷ For Mencius, such situations fell under the concept *quan* 權, translated as “weighing,” “expediency,” or “discretion.” Confucians differed in their view of this concept. Zhao Qi's 趙岐 (?-201) commentary glossed *quan* as “uncanonical but good” 反經而善.⁹⁸

argue that the Southern Song surcharges remained onerous. See Bao Weimin 包偉民, *Songdai difang caizheng shi yanjiu* 宋代地方財政史研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001).

⁹⁵ Brutality had long been part of Chan rhetoric, and Luo quoted Dahui Zonggao's 大慧宗杲 (1089-1163) sanguinary metaphors in his explanations of Chan: “It can be likened to a person packing a cart of weapons. If you use one item, then you further take out another item to use. That is not the way to kill people. In my case, if I have only an inch of iron, then I can kill people” 譬如人載一車兵器，弄了一件，又取出一件來弄，便不是殺人手段。我則只有寸鐵，便可殺人. *Helin, yi bian, juan 1*, p. 131. Luo tells us that Zhu Xi liked this explanation. See Li Jingde 黎靖德 (ed.), *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類, annot. Wang Xingxian 王星賢, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994), *juan 8*, p. 137.

⁹⁶ *Helin, yi bian, juan 6*, p. 220.

⁹⁷ Ruan Yuan (ed.), *Mengzi zhushu, juan 7 xia*, pp. 134b-135a.

⁹⁸ Jiao Xun 焦循, *Mengzi zhengyi* 孟子正義, annot. Shen Wenzhuo 沈文倬, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), *juan 15*, pp. 521-522.

Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), however, insisted on the identity of the expedient with canonical, while Zhu Xi conceded the possibility that people might need deviate from moral norms, but stipulated that only the sages might do so.⁹⁹

For his part, Luo did not refer to *quan* or moral dilemmas, and the “intelligent” people in *Helin yulu* at times make highly unconventional choices and engage in fraud. To return to the entry cited above, Luo supplied no fewer than nine anecdotes as supporting evidence. They included famous childhood tales about Sima Guang and Wen Yanbo 文彥博 (1006-1097), but a more representative sample follows:

Generations have passed down that when Zhao Congshan was governor of Lin'an, the eunuch agency wanted to make his life difficult.¹⁰⁰ One day they demanded three hundred red tables for the palace and limited him to one day to handle it. Congshan ordered that three hundred identical tea tables be procured in the market. They were pasted over with Qingjiang paper and then brushed with red paint. The job was swiftly finished.

世傳趙從善尹臨安，宦寺欲窘之。一日，內索朱紅卓子三百隻，限一日辦。從善命於市中取茶卓一樣三百隻，糊以清江紙，用朱漆塗之，咄嗟而成。¹⁰¹

Apparently, Zhao did not negotiate or protest this unreasonable requisition, and Luo did not comment on the moral worth of Zhao's response, which involved considerable deception. While the eunuchs were not Zhao's peer officials, neither were they his adversaries; both parties served the same dynasty. Instead, Luo celebrated Zhao's

⁹⁹ For a summary of their positions, see Benjamin A. Elman, “Ming Politics & Confucian Classicism: The Duke of Chou Serves King Ch'eng,” in Lin Ching-chang 林慶彰 and Chiang Chiu-hua 蔣秋華 (eds.), *Mingdai Jingxue guoji yantaohui lunwenji* 明代經學國際研討會論文集 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo choubenchi, 1996), pp. 109-111.

¹⁰⁰ Zhao Shiyi 趙師異 (1148-1217). He served as Lin'an 臨安 prefect in 1197-1198. See Qian Yueyou 潛說友, *Xianchun Lin'an zhi* 咸淳臨安志, annot. Wang Yuansun 汪遠孫, *Song Yuan difangzhi congshu* 宋元地方志叢書, vol. 7 (Taipei: Dahua shuju, 1980), *juan* 48, pp. 4318b-4319a.

¹⁰¹ *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 6, p. 220. According to Chen You 陳樞 (*jinshi* 1190), Qingjiang paper was the finest to be found in Jiangxi. See Jean-Pierre Drège, *Le Papier dans la Chine impériale: origine, fabrication, usages* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2017), VI.3, p. 62.

resourcefulness and efficiency.¹⁰² Elsewhere in the anthology, Luo related how Fan Zhongyan, as Hangzhou prefect, responded to dearth conditions by encouraging Buddhist monks to renovate their temples and treating himself to pleasure trips. Superiors impeached Fan, who countered that these policies served to employ and feed needy commoners. That year in the region, we are told, only Hangzhou escaped starvation.¹⁰³

Other cases concerned mastery of the battlefield and the game board. To wit, while Song generals routinely lost in early thirteenth century conflicts, Bi Zaiyu 畢再遇 (1148-1217) stood apart, defeating Jurchen forces and aboriginal rebels. His success drew from a host of inventive schemes, employing by turns straw soldiers, fake banners, sheep, and even food for exhausted enemy horses.¹⁰⁴ Luo did not examine the sources of Bi's tactical imagination, suggesting that Bi drew from his inborn gifts. Similarly, heaven-sent endowments accounted for Lu Jiuyuan's quick command of the game *go*, which prizes mental agility. After watching *go* matches in the Lin'an market, Lu suddenly grasped that the game "was the calculations of the River Chart 河圖數."¹⁰⁵ He soon beat the market's best players, who declared Lu had no peer in the empire. To explain Lu's feat, Luo simply declared that "his intelligence surpassed others this way" 其聰明過人如此.¹⁰⁶ These successes, in Luo's depiction, did not derive from canonical erudition or moral cultivation; he drew no explicit link between apprehension of the Way and nimble thinking. In his silence, the Confucian anthologist suggested that practical learning went

¹⁰² Three other tales also see officials turning to the market meet emergency needs. *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 6, pp. 220-221.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, *jia bian*, *juan* 3, p. 52. The events took place in 1050. Luo further related how an official complained to Vice Minister Chen Dang 陳讜 (*jinsshi* 1164) about extravagant Buddhist constructions, said to sap the people's resources. Chen replied, "[The monks] collect money from the rich households and distribute it among the poorer sorts, the humble commoners will rely on this to eat, and [the Buddhists] just get one stupa. In years of dearth, I fear only that the Buddhists do not build stupas" 斂之於富厚之家，散之於貧窶之輩，是小民藉此以得食，而贏得一塔耳。當此荒歲，惟恐僧之不為塔也。 *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, *yi bian*, *juan* 3, p. 173.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, *bing bian*, *juan* 1, p. 249. The River Chart, said to appear on a dragon's back as it emerged from the Yellow River, was said to be part of ancient imperial regalia. Apart from the grid pattern shared by the River Chart and a *go* board, it is unclear what were the common points that Lu perceived.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

well beyond the classical curriculum.¹⁰⁷

In fact, many accounts of quick-witted, effective responses to emergencies in *Helin yulu* featured presumably unlettered commoners. Two exceptional entries involve complex subterfuge and considerable nerve. In one case, tea merchants, taking up arms against the Southern Song, coerced one of their elderly peers, one Lai Wenzheng 賴文政, into being their leader. Lai, said to be “highly intelligent” (*duozhi* 多智), protested that the dynasty still possessed Heaven’s Mandate, but the rebels did not listen. He did recruit another man, surnamed Liu 劉, who resembled him. As government troops closed in, Lai met with the state’s delegates and set a date for his band’s surrender. Returning to his followers, he said he must bow to the inevitable and commit suicide. In the event, though, Lai had Liu beheaded, and then he slipped away, leaving government soldiers convinced they had found the corpse of the rebel leader.¹⁰⁸

Another narrative told of a well-executed entrapment. Wang Fu 王鈇 (?-1149) serving as Panyu 番禺 (present-day Guangzhou) commander, became anxious on learning that Han Huang 韓璜 (*jinsshi* 1130), as the new Guangdong Superintendent, would soon inspect his work. His agitation puzzled his concubine, a former courtesan. She dismissed his fears, saying that Han had been one of her regular customers and that “more than anyone, he liked to have a good time” 最好歡.¹⁰⁹ All that Wang needed to

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 3, p. 173. Remarks elsewhere hint at Luo’s dissatisfaction with Confucian rigidity and myopia. In his account of the Huaixi mutiny, he comments about the ill-fated Lü Zhi: “[Lü] Zhi was a Confucian and did not understand how to adapt to change” [呂] 祉，儒者，不知變。Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 28. Another entry relates Wei Liaoweng’s compilation of *Records of Accomplished and Worthy*, or *Daxianlu* 達賢錄 (no longer extant), which collected earlier works as a guide for self-cultivation and bettering the world. Such laudable literary efforts, Luo implied, still did not address the vital, practical problems of assessing particular individuals and employing them appropriately. “Yet recommending gentlemen is not hard; knowing gentlemen is hard. As for Bian He’s knowing jade and Jiu Fanggao’s knowing horses, how they be transmissible methods?” 然薦士非難，識士為難。卞和之識玉，九方臯之識馬，此豈有法之可傳哉。Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 34. In a further entry, Luo continued this stress on basic learning and extolled the *Analects* 論語 as the only indispensable book. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 1, p. 128.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 36. Brutality and deception figure in another entry, which relates three cases in which elites and their social inferiors, in flight and in disguise, drew suspicions from hostile parties. The servants (or in one case, a monk) then cursed and soundly beat their superiors. The violence hoodwinked their would-be captors, who did not arrest them, and saved their superiors’ lives. Ibid., *juan* 1, p. 8.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 6, p. 227.

do would be to soon invite him to a drinking party, and then “this concubine should have the means to destroy his defenses” 妾當有以敗其守。¹¹⁰ At the party, the other courtesans, appearing in light makeup, pretended to be maids to allay Han’s suspicions.¹¹¹ After several rounds, the courtesan-turned-concubine, from behind a curtain, suddenly burst into one of Han’s favorite songs. Elated, Han asked her to reveal herself, but she refused, demanding that he first dance for her. He consented, first donning a dancing shirt 舞衫 and makeup, and then, dead drunk, falling flat on his face. Wang and his assistants promptly had Han sent back to his office. When Han revived, his disheveled appearance left him humiliated, and, eventually, he, not Wang, met with impeachment. Although the story began with a remark on Wang’s bad reputation (*you langji sheng* 有狼藉聲), Luo’s conclusion condemned Han’s lack of self-control. He did not mention the scheme itself, but the attention given the affair’s details attested to his appreciation for ex-courtesan’s cleverness and efficacy.¹¹²

Finally, commoners showed themselves to be shrewd judges of elite political life. A soldier, hearing that a noble family had purchased firewood in great quantity, derided its complacency. In his view, “Court gentlemen today know nothing of tomorrow’s affairs. Yet they buy 600 strings’ worth of timber!” 朝士今日不知明日事，乃買柴六百貫耶。¹¹³ For his part, a clerk on Hu Quan’s staff showed comparable perspicacity before Hu submitted his famous memorial asking for Qin Gui’s execution. Hu had ripped up his draft after a friend, reminding Hu of his aged mother, cautioned him against taking unnecessary risks. The clerk, however, reminded Hu that the memorial’s contents already had been leaked. Consequently, “If the memorial goes up and offends people, your passing will be glorious. If you do not send it up but offend people, your passing will be obscure. For now, this calamity probably is worse than not sending it up” 書上而得罪，其去光華。不上而得罪，其去曖昧，且其禍恐甚於不上也。¹¹⁴ Thus enlightened, Hu redrafted his memorial, secured his family’s safety with a friend, and then lodged his

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 227-228.

¹¹¹ The text hints that these ruses were Wang’s idea, but they might just as easily have been the concubine’s brainchild, given her initial confidence.

¹¹² For more of such schemes, see Beverly J. Bossler, “Shifting Identities: Courtesans and Literati in Song China,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 62.1 (2002), p. 18, n. 46.

¹¹³ *Helin, yi bian*, juan 1, p. 133.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., *bing bian*, juan 5, p. 327.

famous protest. Luo praised the foresight of both men, declaring in the first example, “The understanding of most literati does not match that of this soldier” 士大夫之見，有不如此卒者多矣，and asserting in second case, “This clerk truly was Zhongjian’s [Hu Quan’s] loyal subject. His understanding was such that most literati do not match him” 此吏真忠簡之忠臣，其識見如此，士大夫不如者多矣. Strictly speaking, “understanding” (*jian* 見) refers to an activity and “intelligence” (*zhi* 智) denotes an inborn capacity, but their usage in *Helin yulu* here signifies alike a grasp of the world’s vicissitudes. While the soldier counseled prudence and the clerk boldness, both men demonstrated the vital need for flexibility.¹¹⁵

6. Agency and Destiny

Amid the topical diversity and political disorder in *Helin yulu*, we may still discern a few general patterns. Luo Dajing did not always explicitly articulate these concepts, such as the importance of physical courage or the resourcefulness of commoners. When the subject turned at times to fundamental principles, the anthologist set forth his point of view as much as he recounted anecdotes, doing so to an unusual degree for the *biji* genre. To wit, Luo’s work propounded three basic tenets. The first one, given the least space but expressed with exceptional clarity, asserted that great changes wrought by great men invariably provoked substantial resistance, which must be brushed aside for the greater good. Second, one could detect in worldly affairs the workings of a moral, heavenly principle, rewarding the good and punishing the evil. Third, history presented instances

¹¹⁵ Luo embodied this flexibility in his balanced remarks on famous literati. For example, although he saluted Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072) for his peerless command of various literary genres, he faulted Ouyang for not retiring to his Jiangxi home, misunderstanding the *Zuozhuan*, judging Buddhism superficially, and lacking the ability to accept as grand councilor the same sort of fierce criticism that he had earlier dealt out as censor. Ibid., *juan* 2, pp. 264-265; *jia bian*, *juan* 1, pp. 15-16; *juan* 2, pp. 22-23; *yi bian*, *juan* 2, p. 195; *bing bian*, *juan* 2, pp. 259-260. Other criticized luminaries included Su Shi, Han Yu, and even King Wu of the Zhou. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 187-188; *jia bian*, *juan* 1, pp. 4-5; *yi bian*, *juan* 5, pp. 213-214. The sum effect taught readers that all “great men” committed errors, that one could not manage the world by rote, and that each situation demanded its separate assessment. Or, to cite the *Siku quanshu* bibliographers, Luo was “not confused about the sages and worthies” 不謬於聖賢. Ibid., *fulu* 3, p. 377.

where this principle did not appear to hold sway, and one could only interpret the course of events as resulting from the force of circumstances. Significantly, Luo verifies the truth of these three ideas with cases of conflict and violence.

6.1 Distinguished Accomplishments

The first law insisted that heroes inevitably struggled with their contemporaries. Luo developed this point in one long entry, which merits attention for its undisguised purpose. Most of its first half cited one of Zhu Xi's letters, in which Zhu responded to concerns that his land survey in Zhangzhou 漳州 would disturb the people.¹¹⁶ Zhu noted that Li Chunnian's 李椿年 (?-1159) much larger effort in the Shaoxing 紹興 era (1131-1162) aroused considerable opposition, but that the final results had satisfied all concerned. Similarly, the sages of antiquity, as well as the Han dynasty founder, had conscripted great numbers of subjects to carry out their projects. Initially, these efforts probably had displeased many people, but they later understood how these enterprises served the greater good. As Zhu proposed, "In all matters, the important thing is how they will turn out in the long run, and that is all.... How can we not know that people's constant feelings are to hate work and delight in ease? Yet if one views the reality of gains and losses, there are unavoidable matters, and that is all" 凡事亦要其久遠如何耳。……豈不知人之常情，惡勞喜逸，顧以為利害之實，有不得而避者耳。¹¹⁷ Luo elaborated this argument, citing the construction of the Shang and Zhou capitals (and their presumed difficulties) and quoting Sima Xiangru 司馬相如 (179 B.C.-117 B.C.), "The beginning of the start of the extraordinary is what the common people fear. When it is finished, then the empire is at ease" 非常之元，黎民懼焉。及臻厥成，天下晏如也。¹¹⁸ These views of Zhu and Luo concerning moral, sage authorities and the singularity, even inscrutability of their civilizing visions, then, drew from a long, distinguished pedigree.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 6, pp. 110-111. The letter is "Da Wang Zihe 答王子合." See Zhu Xi, *Zhu Xi ji*, vol. 4, *juan* 49, p. 2377.

¹¹⁷ Helin, *jia bian*, *juan* 6, p. 110.

¹¹⁸ Sima Qian, *Shiji*, vol. 9, *juan* 117, p. 3050. I adopt the translation found in Ssu-ma Ch'ien, *The Grand Scribe's Records: The Memoirs of Han China, Part III*, eds. William H. Nienhauser, Jr. et al. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016), p. 130.

In light of the widespread condemnation in the Southern Song of Wang Anshi's New Policies, this opinion raises questions. Luo's stance appears even odder, given his pointed remarks about Wang elsewhere in *Helin yulu*. In his conclusion to the entry, Luo addressed the eleventh-century experience and gave no ground.

During the Jiayou reign [1056-1063], Dongpo [Su Shi] composed "Discussion on Thinking about Government." It said, "What is called obeying the masses is not obeying the voices of many people. It is only obeying what they are united in but do not say, and that is all." This explanation is best. But later when Jinggong [Wang Anshi] carried out the New Policies, his excellency [Su Shi] sent up a letter disputing them. He then said, "For those in charge of the country, before they discuss the correctness of the tasks to be carried out, they first observe what the masses' hearts favor and oppose." But this explanation has problems. In this world, how can we have policies that oppose principle and harm the Way, which one can carry out for the time being because that is what the masses favor? It is appropriate that this point was inadequate to persuade Jinggong, and one can criticize [Su's argument] as Warring States strategic learning.

東坡嘉祐間作〈思治論〉¹¹⁹ 曰：「所謂從眾者，非從眾多之口也，從其不言而同然者耳。」其說最好。然厥後荊公行新法，公上書爭之，乃曰：「為國者未論行事之是非，先觀眾心之向背。」¹²⁰ 其說卻有病，天下豈有悖理傷道之事，可以眾心之所向而姑為之乎！宜其不足以服荊公，而指為戰國縱橫之學也。¹²¹

Su Shi, the entry argued, had earlier understood what leaders ought to do but later fell into confusion, as Luo took issue with a point Su made in 1071 in one of his best-known criticisms of the New Policies. For our purposes, the vital point concerns how Luo objected to Su's failure to grasp first how principle and the popular will might differ, as

¹¹⁹ See Su Shi, *Su Shi wenji* 蘇軾文集, annot. Kong Fanli 孔凡禮, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), *juan* 4, pp. 115-119. The work was written in 1063.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, *juan* 25, p. 730.

¹²¹ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 6, p. 111.

well as the primacy of former over the latter.¹²² Indeed, given's Luo condemnation of Wang elsewhere, his approval of Wang's disregard for Su's opposition is jarring. In an unexpected twist, the anthologist asserts his *daoxue* credentials in his insistence that great scholar-officials above all uphold principle, despite unpleasant political realities.

This tough-minded approach to principle illustrated that Luo's Mencian sentiments had their limits. As noted in the article's beginning, state violence had its place. Luo demonstrated this view in an entry concerning Zhang Yong's 張詠 (946-1015) service as Chongyang 崇陽 (Hubei) magistrate.¹²³ Zhang caught a clerk with a stolen coin from the county treasury and set about to punish him with the heavy stick. The clerk taunted Zhang, saying that Zhang could beat him but not behead him. Hearing such defiance, Zhang changed the sentence, personally decapitated the man, and then impeached himself. Luo contextualized the incident in the unsettled social climate of tenth century, in which subordinates intimidated their superiors, and concluded, "This move of Guaiya [Zhang Yong] was not done for the sake of a single cash. Its significance was profound, and the event was awesome" 乖崖此舉，非為一錢而設，其意深矣，其事偉矣。¹²⁴ This approval of Zhang's severity toward an impudent clerk, juxtaposed with Luo's preference for leniency toward offending officials, suggests that Luo, in the Confucian tradition, employed different standards for different classes. Zhang's self-impeachment testified to his recognition that he had violated bureaucratic norms and ought to meet with official censure. He had done so without regret, acting arguably in the service of the vital principle governing relations between superiors and inferiors.

6.2 The Triumph of the Good

Complementing unusual individuals enforcing this Confucian-tinged *realpolitik* were larger forces, namely the workings of a cosmic, ethical order. This heavenly authority in many instances exerted its will by turning even the most violent sorts to do

¹²² Su had argued that Shang Yang had ignored the popular will and so brought on his own family's downfall. Luo contended that Su, among others, exaggerated the incident's significance. In his view, "[Officials] should only discuss the correctness of [a plan's] principle and if the business ought to be carried out" 唯當論理之是非，事之當否爾。Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 191-192.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

good. For example, Xiang Yu's failure to carry out his threat to boil Han Gaozu's father verified for Luo Mencius's claim that killing another's father was tantamount to murdering one's own.¹²⁵ Consequently, "We then know that there always is heavenly principle in the breasts of [even] fierce men. It only lies in there being occasion to express it, and that is all" 乃知驚猛之人，胸中未嘗無天理，特在於有以發之耳。¹²⁶ Thus, the sanguinary Xiang Yu could not escape ethical imperatives. In the same fashion, even merchants, scorned for their selfishness, might behave with magnanimity and then receive due compensation. One childless merchant, urged by his wife to buy a concubine, took her advice and money, and did so. The purchased young woman turned out to be a daughter of an official, who had sold her to compensate for grain shipment losses accrued in his state service. The merchant, moved by the family's plight, returned her to her home and did not request any reimbursement.¹²⁷ His wife, commented, "If milord is so conscientious, why worry that you will not have a son?" 君用心如此，何患無子。She shortly became pregnant, and, on the eve of her son's birth, the village residents dreamed of the announcement of a first-place examination finisher. Luo did not propose that these events represented the workings of resonance (*ganying* 感應) or karmic retribution.¹²⁸ In a sense, however, the wife's remark made further comment unnecessary; because the universe functioned in a coherent, moral way, she knew that her husband's appropriate recompense was only a matter of time.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 32. Ruan Yuan (ed.), *Mengzi zhushu*, *juan* 14 *shang*, p. 250a. In Mencius's view, the murdered man's son inevitably would take revenge on the murderer's own father.

¹²⁶ *Helin, jia bian*, *juan* 2, p. 32.

¹²⁷ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, p. 192. The son was the eminent scholar-official Feng Jing 馮京 (1021-1094). Accounts of officials rescuing similarly unfortunate young women appear in earlier sources, which testify to the Confucian literati's moral superiority over merchants. See Beverly J. Bossler, "Shifting Identities: Courtesans and Literati in Song China," pp. 35-36. This entry, with its merchant-cum-savior, thus stands apart.

¹²⁸ In the anthology's few Buddhist-related entries, Luo shows no affinity for Buddhist teachings and argues that they derive from Daoism. *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 194-195; *bing bian*, *juan* 3, p. 286. However, he expresses a belief in reincarnation, in a note involving Empress Wu of the Tang and Consort Xiao 蕭妃. As the empress had the consort executed, the latter wished that she be reborn as a cat and the empress as a rat. The story became part of common lore, and Luo admitted that he enjoyed watching cats catch rats. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 4, pp. 195-196.

¹²⁹ In another entry, discussed in part earlier in the article, Luo noted that generous merchants earned far more than their stingier colleagues. As he put it, they "consequently detested husband-and-wife peddlers

Heavenly principle left its mark especially in war and politics. Writing perhaps with an eye to the imminent conflict with the Mongols, Luo listed four great battles where Han regimes, based in the south, turned back northern invasions.¹³⁰ The victories, he explained, drew from “heavenly providence” (*tianxing* 天幸) or “heavenly assistance” (*tianzhu* 天助). This history presumably supplied grounds for thirteenth-century readers to hope that celestial powers might aid the Song in the future. Another entry, focusing on individuals, listed cases where the persecutors and would-be assassins of upstanding officials suddenly died, prompting Luo to comment, “Is it possible to say that Heaven does not protect the loyal and worthy?” 謂天不佑忠賢，可乎。¹³¹ In other cases, the anthologist did not explicitly mention heaven, but its salutary power still left its mark. For example, Luo related how officials met demotion and ostracization for befriending Qin Gui’s foes, while the latter were in exile. After Qin’s death, their unflinching devotion won them office, while Qin’s faction crumbled. This rightful denouement led Luo to conclude, “Gentlemen support gentlemen, and petty men wrong petty men” 君子贏得做君子，小人枉了做小人。¹³² Loyalty and moral behavior would win out.

6.3 Implacable Destiny

Although these cases attested that heaven’s moral force supported the Song and good Confucians, Luo Dajing was not naïve. History, whether writ large or small, could take inexplicable turns, for which moral explanations fell short. In one of *Helin yulu*’s longest entries, the anthologist assembled sections of *Shangshu*, *Analects*, *Zuozhuan* 左傳, and *Shijing* 詩經 to argue that Confucius understood that the Zhou would never recover its power and that the Qin would take its place as the empire’s unifier.¹³³ Confucius’s prescience, Luo claimed, did not derive from his prowess at prognostication

splitting their profits and guarding every little bit” 若惡販夫販婦之分其利，而靳靳自守。 Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 6, p. 102.

¹³⁰ Ibid., *juan* 1, p. 7.

¹³¹ Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 2, p. 153. Zhang Jun’s escape from Qin Gui’s alleged assassination plot drew the same comment from Luo. Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 1, p. 6.

¹³² Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 2, p. 146.

¹³³ Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 5, pp. 83-84. Luo here elaborates at great length a point suggested by Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011-1077). See Shao Yong, *Huangji jingshi shu* 皇極經世書, *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu* 景印文淵閣四庫全書, vol. 803 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), p. 1041.

(*shu* 數) but from his grasp of the force of circumstances (*shi* 勢).¹³⁴ Having failed to find a state position, Confucius realized that “the Way could not be put into practice, and that is where the force of circumstances led. It was what could not be held back” 則道不獲行，而勢之所趨。有不可挽者矣。No one needed evidence of the Sage’s wisdom; Luo’s stress lay rather in the inexorable rise of a fearsome, semi-foreign kingdom that unified China. The parallels with the expansion of the Mongol empire in the mid-thirteenth century, one may surmise, were unmistakable. Nothing in Luo’s discussion intimates that readers should welcome the onset of foreign conquest, but the precedent suggested that they might not be able to do anything to prevent it.

Other entries also argued for historical predestination. After Qin Gui’s death in 1155, many literati voiced their frustration at the Southern Song’s inability to retake the occupied Central Plain. As we have seen, Luo Dajing did likewise. Yet he also conceded, after a review of twelfth-century history, “Then we know the separation and unity of north and south naturally has its fixed fate. Even excellent, enlightened rulers cannot force matters” 乃知南北分合，自有定數，雖英明之主，不能強也。¹³⁵ The review related a conversation between Song Gaozong and Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133-1180).¹³⁶ Zhang had debriefed a Song envoy, fresh from a mission to the Jin, and the emperor learned about the Jin’s troubles, deciding that the time had not yet come for a northern expedition. His successor, Song Xiaozong had intentions to recover the north, but he lacked able leaders and adequate resources, and honored his father’s preference for stability and peace. Although the dynasty’s balance sheet later improved and Xiaozong considered mobilizing his forces, the Song military showed little appetite for further

¹³⁴ This is a provisional translation. The English-language translators of the *Huainanzi* 淮南子 gloss this word as “propensity, trajectory, positional advantage, force, power” and then note “*Shi* is a very rich term that has no close equivalent in English.” See Liu An, *The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China*, eds. John S. Major et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 889.

¹³⁵ *Helin, bing bian*, juan 4, p. 302. For studies of fate, heaven, and their moral and amoral workings, see Ning Chen, “The Concept of Fate in Mencius,” *Philosophy East & West*, 47.4 (1997), pp. 495-520; Michael Puett, “Following the Commands of Heaven: The Notion of *Ming* in Early China,” in Christopher Lupke (ed.), *The Magnitude of Ming: Command, Allotment, and Fate in Chinese Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), pp. 49-69; Mercedes Valmisa, “The Reification of Fate in Early China,” *Early China*, 42 (2019), pp. 147-199.

¹³⁶ Zhang was a son of Zhang Jun.

conflict. These details served to absolve the throne of doubts about its commitment to the northern homeland. Luo's conclusion recognized the limits of individual agency and gave Luo's readers a means to interpret recent history, without villains.¹³⁷

7. Conclusion

In *Helin yulu*, Confucian principles, literary acumen, marked skepticism, and an appreciation for adaptability and efficiency coexist in a complex mix. Luo Dajing's passages supply examples of courage, loyalty, asceticism, and cleverness, but the successes of these individuals were small scaled and short lived. The general tone is pessimistic; while hindsight tells us that Luo lived in an age on the decline, one speculates that he knew it already. Was Luo's perspective unusual? Sources do not permit a clear, let alone conclusive, answer. That being said, if his outlook did not represent mainstream views, the book's wide circulation illustrates that his contemporaries and immediate posterity valued highly Luo's observations.

As is well known, *biji* hold forth on all manner of subjects, and *Helin yulu* is no exception. That being said, compilers discuss some topics and leave others unremarked on, and so a look at unmentioned subjects can prove instructive. When compared to other anthologists, Luo says less about the examination system, ritual issues, or fiscal questions, although his anecdotes and comments on these matters are compelling. Luo also does not inveigh against heterodox teachings (*yiduan* 異端), Buddhism and Daoism.¹³⁸ Nor do

¹³⁷ In another passage, Luo noted how Wang Gong 王鞏 (c. 1048-c. 1117) and Zhao Lingchou 趙令疇 (1061-1134) had remained loyal to Su Shi during the latter's exile. In Song Huizong's 徽宗 (r. 1101-1125) reign, however, the two behaved obsequiously to court eunuchs. For an explanation of their transformation, Luo turned to Zhu Xi's commentary on the *Lisao* 離騷, which read, "[When] the world falls into disorder, customs fray, and literati lack a constant hold on themselves, [because they fear] petty people will harm them [for not conforming to contemporary norms]" 世亂俗薄，士無常守，乃小人害之。The two men fell victim, according to this line of argument, to the moral rot of the late Northern Song, leaving the anthologist to lament, "Alas! Those Chongning, Daguan, Zhenghe, and Xuanhe periods! It was fitting that the two men changed their standards and altered their conduct" 嗚呼！其崇、觀、政、宣之時乎，宜二子之改節易行也。 *Helin, yi bian*, *juan* 1, pp. 122-123.

¹³⁸ Luo's entries concerning Buddhism are few and present mixed views. He disapproved of how officials invited monks to preach on the dharma at government offices on the emperor's birthday and seconded Zhu Xi in holding that Buddhism derived from Lao-Zhuang thought. *Ibid.*, *juan* 3, p. 164; *juan* 4, pp.

readers hear much about the era's emperors, Ningzong and Lizong 理宗 (r. 1225-1265), and its dominant political figure, Shi Miyuan, probably because Shi's successors as grand councilor were his protégé, Zheng Qingzhi 鄭清之 (1176-1251), and later his nephew, the powerful, controversial Shi Songzhi 史嵩之 (1189-1257).¹³⁹ In addition, Shi Miyuan and Shi Songzhi both promoted *daoxue*, if only in name. If these men did not implement its precepts, neither did they silence and persecute its advocates. Finally, no entry takes up the existential threat posed by the expanding Mongol nation. Put one way, while the conflagration itself goes unreported, *Helin yulu* still has many notices about smoke, ashes, and fire-fighting brigades.

In the long run, institutional matters for Luo perhaps did not (or would not) matter. Despite the importance of institutions, they did not (or would not) prove decisive. What deserved extended consideration were impersonal forces, and, especially, cases of brilliant, brave, individual, moral action. On the one hand, this perspective reflects the Neo-Confucian stresses on self-cultivation and all-encompassing systems of order. From another angle, this emphasis on the particular (seen in Luo's interest in poetry and language) bears the marks of two centuries of factionalism. Even after the Confucian revival nominally prevailed, the dynasty was adrift, and dividing the world between gentlemen (*junzi* 君子) and petty men (*xiaoren* 小人) became even less tenable. All parties, as events unfolded, might earn praise or blame. *Helin yulu*, in sum, offers an opinionated but sober vision, grounded in optimistic principles but deeply aware of the necessity of nimble thinking in the face of human fallibility and history's violence.

(Proofreader: Wu Ke-yi)

194-195; *bing bian*, *juan* 3, p. 286. However, he related at length the clergy's preservation of Su Shi's works during their twelfth-century proscription and found the sangha's strict pedagogy vastly superior to that of the *ru* 儒. Ibid., *yi bian*, *juan* 3, pp. 169-170; *bing bian*, *juan* 3, p. 290.

¹³⁹ I am grateful to Charles Hartman for this insight. In the anthology's sole entry that touches on Ningzong, the monarch cut a well-intentioned, if unimpressive, figure. He consented to listen to Zhu Xi's lectures, heeded warnings about Han Tuozhou, and, after an earlier imperial procession led to a stampede that left many observers dead, stayed in the palace during New Year's festivities to prevent another similar tragedy. Ibid., *jia bian*, *juan* 3, p. 41. As for Shi Miyuan, we learn only that an official chose to defend Shi's residence and not the imperial ancestral temple during a 1231 conflagration in Lin'an, winning widespread condemnation. Ibid., *bing bian*, *juan* 2, p. 265. For an assessment of Shi Songzhi, see Richard L. Davis, *Court and Family in Sung China, 960-1279: Bureaucratic Success and Kinship Fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 142-157.

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一種十三世紀的視角： 《鶴林玉露》中的美德、勇氣與暴力

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摘 要

本文彙整並討論了十三世紀中期的筆記《鶴林玉露》之中的數十篇條目。該書的編撰者是羅大經，他對當時的社會風氣看法頗為悲觀，並且描述了不少暴力事件。通過分析，本文認為《鶴林玉露》的其中一個撰作目的，是要幫南宋讀者作好面對蒙古帝國入侵的心理準備。這本書編織了一幅政治凋敝、英雄輩出，天道有仁、世道不仁的圖景。該作品反映出的複雜性和不確定性使羅大經將「智」定義為適應性，並列舉出諸多時事為例。

關鍵詞：《鶴林玉露》，羅大經，筆記，宋代士大夫

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