

Zhuangzi and Hui Shi on *Qing* 情*

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ABSTRACT

This essay examines Zhuangzi's idea, in his dialogue with Hui Shi in the *De Chong Fu*, of being without human *qing*. This idea is situated within the contrast that Zhuangzi constantly makes between heaven and human beings. Some contexts for this contrast are described. The essay concludes that *qing* should be read as basically referring to "facts" in the *Zhuangzi*, including certain factual beliefs about (false or mistaken) emotions.

Key Words: Zhuangzi, Hui Shi, *qing*, facts, emotions, heaven, human beings

In the *De Chong Fu* (〈德充符〉) chapter of the *Zhuangzi* (《莊子》) there is the following passage:

Since one is nourished by heaven, what need is there for (what is made/brought about by) human beings! Having the form of human beings, (but) not the *qing* of human beings. Having the form of human beings—thus one congregates with human beings. Not having the *qing* of human beings—thus right and wrong can find no place on one's body. Oh, the insignificant and small, thus they belong to human beings! Oh, the grand and great, only they are one with heaven! (既受食於天，又惡用人！有人之形，無人之情。有人之形，故群於人，無人之情，故是非不得於

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身。眇乎小哉，所以屬於人也！警乎大哉，獨成其天！) (Chen 172)¹

A dialogue between Zhuangzi (莊子) and Hui Shi (惠施) immediately follows this passage. In the dialogue, Hui Shi asks how it is possible for human beings to be without *qing*. Thus, this is the central question both in the above passage and in the dialogue: What does it mean to be without the *qing* of human beings (無人之情)? My main aim in this essay is to try to answer this question.

Before doing so, however, it is necessary to answer two other closely related questions. First, note that the passage above begins and ends with a distinction between heaven (*tian* 天) and human beings (*ren* 人). This raises the question: What motivates the distinction between heaven and human beings? Or, what is the same, under what contexts can this distinction be understood? Second, and quite obviously, we should be able to provide a reading of the term *qing* (情) before answering the central question of what it means to be without the *qing* of human beings. In other words, we would need to answer the question: What is the meaning of *qing* in this passage and in the *Zhuangzi* as a whole?

A. C. Graham has noted that *qing* (情) in this passage “is traditionally but surely mistakenly taken to mean the passions.” He proposes, instead, “essence” as the appropriate reading.² All the other English translators of whom I am aware (and I believe many contemporary Chinese writers too) would disagree. They have read *qing* as meaning the emotions, feelings, affections or inclinations.³ In recent years, Graham has been heavily criticized for his remarks that

1. Guu-Ying Chen, *Zhuangzi jinzhu jinyi (A Contemporary Annotation and Translation of the Zhuangzi)* (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1999). Page numbers are given in brackets in the text of this essay. I have also consulted the following: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Institute of Chinese Studies Ancient Chinese Texts Concordance Series, *Zhuangzi zhuzi suoyin (A Concordance to the Zhuangzi)* (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 2000). Shu-Min Wang, *Zhuangzi jiaquan (Revised Annotations on the Zhuangzi)* (Taipei: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 1994). Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
2. A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” *Studies in Chinese Philosophy & Philosophical Literature* (Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), Appendix: “The Meaning of *Ch’ing* 情,” p. 61. The original version of this essay was published in *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 6.1, 6.2 (1967). See also A. C. Graham (trans.), *Chuang-tzŭ—The Seven Inner Chapters and other writings from the book Chuang-tzŭ* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 82, translation of *qing* as “essentially” and “essentials”.
3. Victor Mair (trans.), *Wandering on the Way—Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), “emotions,” p. 49; Burton Watson (trans.), *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), “feelings,” p. 75; Yu-Lan Fung (trans.), *Chuang-Tzu—A New Selected Translation with an Exposition of the Philosophy of Kuo Hsiang* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,

“Although the word *ch’ing* (*qing*) is very common in pre-Han literature I should like to risk the generalisation that it never means ‘passions’ even in *Hsün-tzŭ* (*Xunzi* 荀子), where we find the usage from which the later meaning developed. As a noun it means ‘the facts’...”⁴

My direct purpose in this essay is not to discuss this controversy, although I will say something about it here and in the conclusion. I have strong reservations about Graham’s use of “essence”, but I will show that in the *Zhuangzi*, with a few exceptions, *qing* does basically refer to the “facts”.⁵ As we shall see, this includes

1989), “affections,” p. 87; Brook Ziporyn (trans.), *Zhuangzi—The Essential Writings* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), “the characteristic human inclinations,” p. 38. Among contemporary Chinese writers or commentators, Guu-Ying Chen, *Zhuangzi jin-zhu jinyi* (*A Contemporary Annotation and Translation of the Zhuangzi*), p. 174, translates 情 as 偏情, which refers to certain human “partialities”. Elsewhere, he explains that Zhuangzi is recommending doing away with various kinds of artifices that humans are partial or disposed toward in terms of their body and to maintain a natural purity of the heart-mind and *de* (德). See Guu-Ying Chen, *Lao Zhuang xinlun* (*New Discourses on Laozi and Zhuangzi*) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Book Company, 1997), p. 190. Wang Bo 王博 takes *qing* to mean *qing gan* (情感), namely, the emotions. However, Wang is careful to note that this doesn’t mean doing away with all the emotions. Like Chen, he stresses cultivating the heavenly *de* and the heart-mind as against the development of human artifices. See Bo Wang, *Zhuangzi zhexue* (*The Philosophy of Zhuangzi*) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004), pp. 68–71. The artifices that both Chen and Wang refer to are mentioned just before the passage we have quoted. These are *zhi* (知) or knowledge, *yue* (約) or bonds, *de* (德), and *gong* (工). These seem to be associated, respectively, with planning and scheming, the “glue” (膠) of the rites, ideas of morality, and commerce. All these are opposed to *tian yu* (天鬻) and *tian shi* (天食) or the “nourishments” provided by heaven or nature. I agree with both Chen and Wang in their stress on this distinction between the human and heaven in their explanation of the passage and the ensuing dialogue. Unlike Chen and Wang, however, I think it is preferable to translate *qing* as “facts”. This has certain advantages that I shall explain, especially in the conclusion of this essay.

4. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” p. 59. For critical discussions of Graham’s view on *qing*, see for example: Anthony C. Yu, *Rereading the Stone—Desire and the Making of Fiction in Dream of the Red Chamber* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chapter 2 “Desire”; Chad Hansen, “Qing (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” in Marks, Joel & Roger T. Ames eds., *Emotions in Asian Thought—A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); Michael Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly: The Notion of *Qing* (情) in Early Chinese Thought,” in Eifring, Halvor ed., *Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004); Chung-Yi Cheng, “Xingqing yu qingxing: lun ming mo taizhouxuepai de qingyuguan (Xingqing and Qingxing: On the Thought of ‘Feeling’ and ‘Desire’ of the Tai-zhou School in Late Ming),” in Xiong, Bing-Zhen & Shou-An Zhang eds. *Qingyu ming qing-da qing pian* (*Sentiments and Desires in Late Imperial China—On Sentiments*) (Taipei: Rye Field Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 23–80.
5. These exceptions, as we shall see, belong to the Outer Chapters (外篇) and the Miscellaneous Chapters (雜篇), instead of the Inner Chapters (內篇). The latter are the first seven

facts with which some emotions are closely involved. Graham's generalization that in the pre-Han literature *qing* never means the passions (or emotions) was over-hasty. Even so, this does not settle the central question which I am concerned with in the *Zhuangzi*, namely, the understanding of what it means to be without the *qing* of human beings. As we shall see, this is a philosophical and logical question that involves an understanding of the distinction between heaven and human beings, and how *qing* is to be read in the context of the *Zhuangzi* itself. I now proceed to a discussion of these questions.

1. Heaven and Human Beings

We cannot give a full account of the distinction and the relation between heaven and human beings in this essay. However, we shall provide a few contexts in which this contrast is made to show its significance for Zhuangzi and in a way that would be relevant to our discussion on what it means to be without the *qing* of human beings.

The passage quoted above is strongly reminiscent of Xunzi's (荀子) remark that Zhuangzi was "blinkered by heaven and did not know human beings." (蔽於天而不知人).⁶ This succinctly captures a central aspect of Zhuangzi's thinking. In the *Zhuangzi*, "heaven" is a synonym for "nature" (自然). This is constantly contrasted with what is made or brought about by human beings. The presumption is that it is best to live and to act in ways that are in accordance with heaven or nature.

One context for this contrast between heaven and human beings is the protest against the implementation of Confucian (儒) moral, social, and political ideals such as *ren* (仁 humaneness), *yi* (義 righteousness) and *li* (禮 rites). These are regarded as artificial impositions on human beings in their natural state. The

chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, widely believed to be authored by Zhuangzi himself. The passage and dialogue we are discussing, from the *De Chong Fu* (〈德充符〉), belongs to the Inner Chapters. For discussions of authorship, see A. C. Graham, "How Much of Chuang-tzu Did Chuang-tzu Write?" in Graham, *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, and Xiaogan Liu, *Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters*, trans. Donald Munro (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1994), Michigan Monographs in Chinese Studies, no.65.

6. Disheng Li, *Xunzi jishi, jie bi pian* (Collected Annotations on the Xunzi, Chapter on Dispelling Blindness) (Taipei: Student Book Store, 1979), p. 478. Mu Qian, *Zhuangzi zuan jian* (Compiled Annotations on the Zhuangzi) (Taipei: Dong Da Tushu Gongsi, 1985), p. 46. has also alluded to this in a comment on the dialogue between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi that follows.

reference to right and wrong in the above passage brings out a related context for the contrast, namely, the ideological debates on how to structure human relations and to impose social order. The attachments to systems of thought in these debates are said to betray preconceived ideas, prejudices, and motives of profit and fame. Zhuangzi's stated preference for living and acting in accordance with heaven is a rejection of these attachments and their associated states of mind such as deep anxieties and a "smallness" or meanness of attitude toward the perspectives held by others.

In the *Qiwulun* (〈齊物論〉) chapter, for instance, Zhuangzi describes the interminable wrangling and anxious states of mind of those engaged in these debates. He contrasts these debates and the states of mind behind them with the "pipes of heaven" (*tian lai* 天籟), that is, the natural sounds of the hollows in the forest when the wind blows. The sounds cease when the wind does whereas the debaters do not know when to stop. Even when asleep, their spirits cross with each other (*qi mei ye hun jiao* 其寐也魂交). Zhuangzi refers specifically to the Confucians and the Mohists (儒墨) when he answers the following rhetorical questions that he himself poses:

Where is the *dao* hidden such that there is (dispute over) genuine and false? How are words (or teachings) hidden such that there is (dispute over) right and wrong? Where is the *dao* headed such that it no longer remains? Where do words (or teachings) reside such that they forbid (others)? The *dao* is hidden by small prejudices and words (or teachings) hide behind eloquence. Thus, there are the disputes of the Confucians and Mohists over right and wrong. They affirm what the other denies and deny what the other affirms. Wishing to affirm what the other denies and to deny what the other affirms—well, there is nothing better than illumination. (道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？道惡乎往而不存？言惡乎存而不可？道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。故有儒墨之是非，以是其所非而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。) (Chen 56)

In other words, we fail to see the *dao* (what is given by heaven or is natural) because it is "hidden" by distinctions such as those made by the Confucians and Mohists. Their prejudices, concealed by their eloquence, drive them to contradict each other. This betrays a smallness of mind that is unable to accommodate different perspectives.

How are we to read the last statement that if we wish to affirm what the other party denies or *vice versa*, there is nothing better than "illumination" (*ming* 明)? There could be different interpretations here. However, consistently with what has been said so far, I would read this as a dismissive rejection of the ideo-

logical quarrels of the Confucians and Mohists. Given the contrast between what is made or brought about by human beings and what is given by heaven, it is plausible to read “illumination” as what is provided by heaven. It suggests a natural state of clarity and calmness that results from freeing oneself from the human-made distinctions in these debates.⁷

It will be evident later how this brief contextual description of the contrast between heaven and human beings helps us to understand philosophically the claim that it is possible for one to be without the *qing* of human beings. We shall now examine the term *qing* and its various nuances throughout the *Zhuangzi*.⁸

2. The Meaning of *Qing*

To begin with, we can understand *qing* as referring to “the facts” of something. The most straightforward way in which this occurs is in terms of the phrase “X *zhi qing*” or “the *qing* of (or about) X”. In contemporary Chinese, this notion of the fact or facts of something would be rendered as *shi qing* (實情). This could refer to specific facts about X as a particular item. But as is often the case in the *Zhuangzi*, and especially in the Inner Chapters (內篇), it could also refer to some fundamental fact about X as a general category such as “the myriad things” (*wan wu* 萬物), events or states of affairs in general (*shi* 事), heaven and earth (*tian di* 天地), or human beings (*ren* 人).

If something is said to be a fact, this can be affirmed or denied. We find instances of this in the *Zhuangzi* with regard to *qing*. For instance, the knowledge that someone allegedly possesses is affirmed as a fact in the expression, *qi zhi qing xin* (其知情信), where *qing xin* plays the role of factual affirmation. On the other hand, a doubt can be expressed about whether something is truly the

7. Shu-Min Wang provides another explanation: instead of insisting on and being stuck in their respective positions, the Mohists and the Confucians are being advised to take the other’s perspective upon which they will then gain clarity. See Wang, p. 58. Yuet-keung Lo gives yet another explanation: that instead of “clarity”, *ming* should be “ironically darkness *par excellence*...” In other words, we are being urged to stop our *ming*, reading the *yi* in *yi ming* (以明) as 已. See Yuet-keung Lo, “To Use or Not to Use: The Idea of *Ming* in the *Zhuangzi*,” *Monumenta Serica*, 47(1999), p. 150.

8. I have examined all the instances of *qing* as listed in Institute of Chinese Studies Ancient Chinese Texts Concordance Series, *A Concordance to the Zhuangzi*. What follows is my summation of the uses of *qing* in the text. I will not cite the chapter/page/line references for each use of *qing* that I mention as readers who are interested can look them up easily by checking the Concordance themselves. However, I shall continue to provide page numbers with reference to Chen’s translation where I make reference to a particular chapter or to a more extended quotation.

case by asking, *shi xin qing hu* (是信情乎) which can be rendered, “Is this truly the case?”

A common feature of *qing* is its contrast with *xing* (形). In the *Qiwulun* (〈齊物論〉) Zhuangzi says that if there is a “true lord” (*zhen zai* 真宰) that is in charge of the body, there is no visible sign of it. Nevertheless, it is something that in practice can be attested to (*ke xing yi xin* 可行已信) even though it has no (visible) form (*er bu jian qi xing* 而不見其形). It is described as *you qing er wu xing* (有情而無形). (Chen 51) This last sentence contrasts *qing* and *xing*, meaning that the thing in question is said to *exist* or is a *reality*, even though it has no appearance or visible form.

This question of the “true lord” is mentioned again a few sentences later (now referred to as *zhen jun* 真君). This time, Zhuangzi asks which of the bodily organs plays the role of lord or ruler, and which is subordinate. He answers: “Whether we get at the reality or not, this neither adds nor subtracts from its genuineness or truth.” (*Ru qiu de qi qing yu bu de, wu yi sun hu qi zhen* 如求得其情與不得，無益損乎其真。) (Chen 52) This may seem to be an inconclusive answer, but we learn from it that *qing*—fact or reality—is cognate with *zhen* or what is “genuine” or “true”. The fact or reality, however, may not be evident because it is somehow hidden or has no visible form. This does not detract from its genuineness or truth which can be attested to in some way.

The following sentence (from an Inner Chapter, the *Dazongshi* 〈大宗師〉) sums up what we have said above about *qing* in terms of the hidden reality of the *dao*: *fu dao, you qing you xin, wu wei wu xing* (夫道，有情有信，無爲無形). “The *dao*, it has reality and can be attested to, (though) not (seen to) act and without form.” (Chen 191)

An extended meaning of *qing* is “nature”, as in “human nature”. Thus, in the Outer Chapters (外篇), there are discussions of human nature where the phrase *xing ming zhi qing* (性命之情) is mentioned together with *ren qing* (人情).⁹ For instance, it is stated that things in their proper condition (*zhi zheng zhe* 至正者)

9. See especially chapter 8 “pian mu” (〈駢拇〉), chapter 9 “ma ti” (〈馬蹄〉), chapter 11 “zai you” (〈在宥〉), and chapter 24 “xu wu gui” (〈徐無鬼〉). This extended meaning of *qing* as “human nature”, it should be noted, does not occur in the Inner Chapters. Although the term *ren qing* is mentioned in the Inner Chapters, it is still confined to *qing* in the sense of “facts” or “state of affairs”. We see this in the very first occurrence of *qing* and in the first chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, where a character named *Jian Wu* (肩吾) complains that the words *yan* (言) spoken by *Jie Yu* (接輿) are *bu jin ren qing* (不近人情). From what is mentioned, it is clear that this means being too remote from *states of affairs* as (normally) experienced by humans. In short, we can take *ren qing* here to refer to certain norms of human experience. (〈逍遙遊〉, Chen 24)

do not lose their *xing ming zhi qing*, or the *state* which is given to them as a matter of nature. That which is long, like the legs of certain birds, does not require to be shortened and neither does that which is short need to be lengthened. In this regard, it is added that morality or *ren yi* (仁義) does not belong to human nature (*fei ren qing hu* 非人情乎). (〈駢拇〉, Chen 247) Another term for human nature is *xing qing* (性情). For instance, it is said that for original human nature, there is no use for rites and music (*xing qing bu li, an yong li yue* 性情不離，安用禮樂). (〈馬蹄〉, Chen 260)

These discussions of human nature in the Outer Chapters urge a return to a genuine state (*fan qi zhen* 反其真) which is radically primitive. There is some suggestion, for example, about the non-domestication of animals and the implication that there is no need for the tools of farming since these are human wrought and as such destroy what is given by heaven. However, the real target is the Confucian system of morality and rites. By introducing and imposing morality and the rites, the sages are said to have destroyed an original human nature, just as artisans are said to have destroyed the original material of their artifacts. (〈秋水〉, Chen 447)

In the Inner Chapters, there is also mention of *fan qi zhen*. (〈大宗師〉, Chen 204) However, this is not a reference to an original human nature or a primitive way of life. It is exclaimed by two friends of Zi Sanghu (子桑戶) who are singing at his funeral. They mean that he has “returned to the natural state” while they remain in the realm of human beings. Confucius’s disciple Zigong (子貢) reminds them of the ritual proprieties but is laughed at for not himself expressing a knowledge of “ritual propriety”. This theme that since death is part of a natural process and therefore grief and mourning are inappropriate appears several times in the *Zhuangzi*. Another example occurs in the third chapter, the *Yang-shengzhu* (〈養生主〉). At the funeral of Lao Dan (老聃), his friend Qin Shi (秦失) utters three cries and leaves. This seems too perfunctory and he is asked whether his behavior is appropriate. In reply, he describes the crying of others as “turning away from heaven and violating *qing*” (*dun tian bei qing* 遁天倍情). Here, *qing* complements heaven or *tian*.¹⁰ That is, *qing* refers to the (natural) state of affairs in general and of which Lao Dan’s death is a part. It is a violation of this state of affairs to grieve and to mourn. Qin Shi adds that neither grief nor joy

10. Michael Puett, “The Ethics of Responding Properly,” in Eifring, Halvor ed., *Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature*, p. 57, has made almost the same observation with reference to the same passage: “Heaven and *qing* are thus linked, and both are presented as being in opposition to custom.”

can affect someone who has this perspective (*ai le bu neng ru ye* 哀樂不能入也). (Chen 112)

The reference to *qing* as a general and fundamental fact of natural events undergoing change is also described as *ming* (命). This could be translated as “fate” or “destiny”. However, there are no positive or negative emotional elements associated with this term. For Zhuangzi, *ming* describes the inevitability of natural events. Thus, in the *Dazongshi* (〈大宗師〉) chapter, we find the statement: “Death and life are *ming*, they have the constancy of night and day, they are *tian* (heaven or natural). There are matters which human beings can do nothing about, and this is a general and fundamental fact about all things.” (死生，命也，其有夜旦之常，天也。人之有所不得與，皆物之情也。) (Chen 188)

We may now summarize the meaning of *qing* as described so far. Basically, it refers to the “facts” of something, as in the expression, “X *zhi qing*” or “The *qing* of X”. As such, the *qing* of X can be affirmed or denied. The mention of *qing* can figure in a claim that something exists or is a reality. In this regard, it can be said to exist even though it has no visible form (*xing* 形). By extension of its basic meaning as “facts”, *qing* can be used to refer to the state of human nature, especially in combination with other words such as *xing ming zhi qing* (性命之情) or *xing qing* (性情). In the Outer Chapters human nature is described as an uncontrived natural state and the call is made for a return to what is genuine (*zhen* 真). This remark is also made in the Inner Chapters. But instead of specifically referring to human nature, *zhen* here refers to a natural state of affairs in contrast to what is humanly contrived. We find this contrast too in the expression *dun tian bei qing* (遁天倍情) or “going against heaven and violating the (natural) state of affairs”. This is a judgment that grief and mourning are inappropriate and unnatural reactions toward death.

This belief that grief and mourning over death is unnatural is a central theme of the *Zhuangzi* and it seems to rule out reading *qing* as the “passions” or “emotions” in the text. However, this may not follow since this issue still needs to be settled with regard to the passage quoted in the beginning and the dialogue to be discussed. Also, we have to bear in mind that the *Zhuangzi* is the result of more than one author and there may be other contexts in which the emotions may be said to be naturally expressed. For instance, in the *Shan Mu* (〈山木〉) which is an Outer Chapter, the emperor Shun (舜) is said to have advised his successor Yu (禹) that *qing mo ruo shuai* (情莫若率). Burton Watson translates the sentence as “In the case of the emotions, it is best to let them follow where

they will.”¹¹ Chen Guu-ying has rendered *qing* here as *qing gan* (情感) or the emotions. (Chen 535)

Another instance in which “emotions” is an appropriate rendering of *qing* is in the *Yu Fu* (〈漁父〉), a Miscellaneous Chapter (雜篇). An Old Fisherman describes Confucius as *li hao wu zhi qing, he xi nu zhi jie* (理好惡之情，和喜怒之節). Again, Chen takes *qing* here as *qing gan*. (Chen 841) Watson’s translation is (that Confucius is said to) “regulate the emotions of love and hate, harmonize the seasons of joy and anger...”¹² Shortly after, the Old Fisherman explains what he means by being *zhen* or genuine. He mentions the spontaneous expression of sadness and joy and their central importance in the rites and this contrasts with Confucius’s regulating the emotions.

Although in these examples *qing* can be translated as the emotions without much question, this is not the case with the passage that is the subject of this essay and the dialogue to be discussed. How *qing* should be read here depends on an understanding of the passage and the dialogue, and in the course of the exchange between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi, understanding the claim that it is possible to be without the *qing* of human beings.

3. The Dialogue on Human Beings and *Qing*

An understanding of the dialogue between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi requires an understanding of the passage that precedes it. The earlier discussions of the con-

11. Burton Watson trans., *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, p. 216. Victor Mair trans., *Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu*, p. 193, also uses “emotions” for *qing* here.

12. Burton Watson trans., *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, p. 349. Also Victor Mair trans., *Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu*, p. 321. There are two other cases in which it is uncontroversial for *qing* to be translated as “emotions”. As with the example in the *Yu Fu*, both are in the Miscellaneous Chapters. In the thirty-third and last chapter *Tianxia* (〈天下〉), Song Xing (宋鉞) and Yin Wen (尹文) are described as *qing yu gua qian* (情欲寡淺). Reading *qing yu* as one term, this means that they are said to have (relatively) few desires. If we read *qing* and *yu* separately, it means that they somehow are able to “lessen” their emotions, i.e., do not have an excess of emotions, and have (relatively) few desires which are not overindulged. This chapter succinctly describes the views of various philosophers, including that of Zhuangzi. In this regard, it cannot be said to be a part of the *Zhuangzi per se*. Another instance in which *qing* refers to “emotions” is in the *Lie Yu Kou* (〈列禦寇〉) in which it is said that *ren zhe hou mao shen qing* (人者厚貌深情). (Chen 861-862) Literally, humans have a “thick-appearance” (*hou mao*) and “deep emotions” (*shen qing*). In other words, it is difficult to figure them out and their emotions are hidden.

texts of the contrast between heaven and human beings on the one hand, and of the meaning of *qing* on the other, allow us to provide the following explanation of the passage already cited in the beginning of this essay.

It begins with the statement, "Since one is nourished by heaven, what need is there for human beings!" (*ji shou shi yu tian, you wu yong ren* 既受食於天，又惡用人!) This distinction between heaven and human beings is mentioned again at the end of this short passage in terms of the smallness of the human and the greatness of heaven. This emphasis on the distinction enables us to see that it raises a question about the necessity of imposing human artifices and structures onto what is naturally given. These artifices and structures can be referred to as the facts (*qing*) that have been constructed by human beings. Humans already possess a form given by heaven that is (as yet) free of these human facts (*you ren zhi xing, wu ren zhi qing* 有人之形，無人之情). With this form, they are able to congregate, i.e., live among themselves (*you ren zhi xing, gu qun yu ren* 有人之形，故群於人). Not possessing the facts of human construction means that they are free of the worries and concerns that would be brought about by considerations of right and wrong (*wu ren zhi qing, gu shi fei bu de yu shen* 無人之情，故是非不得於身。)

As we have seen, a context for the contrast or distinction between heaven and human beings is the protest against Confucian moral, social and political ideals. The rites or *li* (禮), for instance, are regarded as artificial structures imposed upon human beings in their natural state. The reference in the passage to being free from the considerations of right and wrong points to a related context for the contrast. This is to attain a natural clarity free from the anxieties of those, like the Confucians and Mohists, who are engaged in ideological debates over the right social and political system.

We may now proceed to an examination of the dialogue between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi (惠施) or Huizi (惠子). As will be evident, it is prompted by and complements the passage we have discussed. I shall first lay out the dialogue in full. This is followed by a line by line analysis.

Huizi: Is it the case that human beings do not possess *qing*? (人故無情乎?)

Zhuangzi: That is so. (然。)

Huizi: A human being that, however, does not possess *qing*—how can that be called "human being"? (人而無情，何以謂之人?)

Zhuangzi: The *dao* has given him an appearance, heaven has given him a form—how could it be that he is not called "human being"? (道與之貌，天與之形，惡得不謂之人?)

- Huizi: Since he is called “human being”, how could it be that he does not possess *qing*? (既謂之人，惡得無情?)
- Zhuangzi: This is not what I mean by *qing*. When I mention “not possessing *qing*”, I am speaking of a human being who does not let likes and dislikes internally harm his body, (but instead) constantly adheres to the natural and not (artificially) add anything to life. (是非吾所謂情也。吾所謂無情者，言人之不以好惡內傷其身，常因自然而不益生也。)
- Huizi: Without adding anything to life, how can the human being have his body (i.e., how can he maintain or preserve his life)? (不益生，何以有其身?)
- Zhuangzi: The *dao* has given him an appearance, heaven has given him a form, and he does not let likes and dislikes internally harm his body. Now you expel your spirit, wear out your vitality, you lean against a tree and mutter, or doze off upon a table. Heaven has chosen your form, (but) you babble on about “hard” and “white”! (道與之貌，天與之形，無以好惡內傷其身。今子外乎子之神，勞乎子之精，倚樹而吟，據槁梧而瞑。天選子之形，子以堅白鳴!) (Chen 175)

Hui Shi’s first question “Is it the case that human beings do not possess *qing*?” arises because he thinks it is contradictory for human beings to be without the facts of human beings. His question seeks a confirmation from Zhuangzi whether this is actually being proposed. Zhuangzi confirms this and Hui Shi then lays bare the apparent contradiction: “A human being that, however, does not possess *qing* (the facts of being a human being)—how can that be called “human being”? (人而無情，何以謂之人?)

Zhuangzi’s reply is, “The *dao* has given him an appearance, heaven has given him a form—how could it be that he is not called “human being”?” This reply emphasizes the natural state given by *dao* and/or heaven. According to Zhuangzi, it is sufficient for human beings in their natural state just to have the appearance and form of human beings. As it stands, however, this reply is unsatisfactory, and we need to supplement it with what is said in the preceding passage: “Having the form of human beings—thus one congregates with human beings.” (有人之形，故群於人。)

The term for “congregates” is *qun* (群 or 羣). In the *Xunzi*, this term occurs in a passage which differentiates human beings from other animals. The former are said to have the ability to *qun* and which the latter lack. This is in turn due to the ability to make conscious social distinctions (分) and to work in concert thus enabling human beings to subdue the animals and perform actions that they are

incapable of.¹³ In other words, for Xunzi, the term *qun* connotes a human society which is realized by the making of conscious and constitutive social distinctions, as distinct from the natural lives of animals. In the *Zhuangzi*, no such distinction between human beings and animals is made. In the *Mati* (〈馬蹄〉) chapter, for instance, there is a description of an original simple state of the world before the imposition of moral and ritual distinctions. In this state, the myriad things—including human beings—live side by side (*wan wu qun sheng* 萬物群生) with each other. (Chen 260) The term *qun sheng* occurs elsewhere in the *Zhuangzi* in terms of nurturing the growth of all things.¹⁴ Thus, for the authors of the *Zhuangzi* and apparently for Zhuangzi himself, the *qun* or congregation of human beings has no special or distinguishing *human* significance. Instead, it connotes a spontaneous growth and harmonious co-existence of things in general.

Hui Shi, however, is dissatisfied with Zhuangzi's answer and persists: "Since he is called 'human being', how could it be that he does not possess *qing*?" Hui Shi is saying that there are facts (*qing*) that constitute or define "human being" and therefore it is a contradiction to say that something can be called a "human being" without at the same time possessing any such facts. In other words, there are factual criteria and norms for what it is to be a human being.

Forced by Hui Shi, Zhuangzi now attempts a clarification. He claims that Hui Shi has misunderstood his use of *qing*: when he proposes that it is possible for human beings not to have *qing*, he means that they do not allow likes and dislikes (*hao wu* 好惡) to harm themselves. The human being should, instead, constantly adhere to the natural (*chang yin zi ran* 常因自然) and not add anything supposedly beneficial to life (*bu yi sheng* 不益生).

On one reading, the mention of "likes and dislikes" means that *qing* refers to the emotions or passions.¹⁵ Thus, what Zhuangzi means by *wu ren zhi qing* in the preceding passage, and by *wu qing* in the dialogue, is for human beings to free themselves of certain emotions because in doing so they can avoid harm to themselves. A. C. Graham has objected to this reading because in the passage, "right and wrong" (*shi fei* 是非) is mentioned (instead of "likes and dislikes") and this is "hardly passion."¹⁶

It is important to note Zhuangzi's essential point, which is that one should

13. Disheng Li, *Xunzi jishi, wang zhi pian* (Collected Annotations on the Xunzi, Chapter on The Regulations of a King) (Taipei: Student Book Store, 1979), p. 180.

14. See especially chapter 13 "zai you" (〈在宥〉). (Chen 293, 298)

15. Bo Wang, *Zhuangzi zhexue* (The Philosophy of Zhuangzi), pp. 69–70.

16. Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," p. 62.

adhere to the natural and not “add” anything to life. He means by this anything external to the “natural”. For instance, death is a natural event which there is no reason to mourn. In this regard, grief and mourning over death are unnecessarily “added” by human beings. (We leave aside, for the time being, the broader question of what constitutes the “natural” and whether Zhuangzi is claiming that *all* emotions are inappropriate.) Having noted this essential point of Zhuangzi’s and given our understanding of Hui Shi’s questions, we see where the disagreement lies:

- (1) For Hui Shi, there are facts about human beings that make them human beings. These facts would depend on how one defines “human being” and in this regard what one thinks is central to the term. This could include the emotions.
- (2) For Zhuangzi, insofar as certain facts are socially constituted by human beings, these are externally added to a “natural” life of human beings. This includes the imposition of social, moral and political structures such as those advocated by the Confucians and Mohists. It also includes certain emotions which Zhuangzi deems as unnatural, harmful and inappropriate.

In response to Zhuangzi’s clarification, Hui Shi asks: “Without adding anything to life, how can the human being have his body?” In other words, it is necessary that human beings engage in at least *some* activities and behavior that would maintain or preserve their lives. Whatever these may be, they would be constitutive of *human* activities and behavior.

Zhuangzi concludes the dialogue by repeating what he has already said: “The *dao* has given him an appearance, heaven has given him a form, and he does not let likes and dislikes internally harm his body.” He adds that the way Hui Shi goes on making distinctions through his logical paradoxes wears him out. But this is an *ad hominem* argument and logically does nothing to blunt the point of Hui Shi’s questions. Hui Shi’s last question, especially, brings up a crucial assumption behind the claim that it is possible for human beings not to add anything to (what has been given by) heaven.

This is the assumption that there is a natural state of the human being which is a state of heaven or the *dao*. This state is free of the supposedly artificial social, moral and intellectual structures imposed by human beings. It is also a state in which at least certain emotions have no legitimate role to play. This natural state is referred to as a state of *qing*, for instance, when the behaviors of grief and mourning are described as *dun tian bei qing* or “turning away from heaven and violating *qing*.”

This raises the question whether there can ever be such a state. Earlier, we noted that in the *Yu Fu* (〈漁父〉) chapter, Confucius is reminded of the value of spontaneous emotional expressions. Thus, what constitutes being “natural” and what is “added” is indeterminate and it may not be the case that Zhuangzi is saying that all emotions are unnatural. Elsewhere and in a lucid moment (in an Inner Chapter 〈大宗師〉) Zhuangzi raises the question, “How is it to be known that what I call heaven is not human? That what is called human is not heaven?” (*Yong ju zhi wu suo wei tian zhi fei ren hu* 庸詎知吾所謂天之非人乎? *Suo wei ren zhi fei tian hu* 所謂人之非天乎?) (Chen 178) That is, the line of demarcation between what is deemed to belong to “heaven” and what is deemed to belong to “human beings” is not self-evidently clear and this can be taken to support the fact that Zhuangzi is not saying that all emotions are unnatural or inappropriate.

Underlying the contrast between heaven and the human, there is also an assumption that the individual can disengage himself or herself from established social, moral, intellectual, emotional structures and relations. As we have seen, Hui Shi has already questioned the possibility of doing this or being in such a state. His argument is that insofar as one is a human being, it is logically impossible not to live according to structures and relations that human beings have established. But there are at least two, more limited ways, of taking Zhuangzi’s assumption of disengagement.

First, when Zhuangzi suggests the possibility of being free of social structures, he may have in mind the corrupting nature of a certain social structure, instead of claiming that one can be free of *any* social structure. Thus, the Confucian system of rites involves knowledge, notions of morality, distinctions of wealth, rank, titles, and so on, which (so it is claimed) would have the tendency to lead people astray, inviting scheming, greed and hypocrisy. Here, it is relevant to note some remarks that he makes just prior to the passage with which we began this essay. He questions the need for *zhi* (知) or knowledge, *yue* (約) or bonds, *de* (德), and *gong* (工), associating them, respectively, with planning and scheming, the “glue” (膠) of the rites, ideas of morality, and commerce. All these are opposed to *tian yu* (天鬻) and *tian shi* (天食) or the “nourishments” provided by heaven or nature. (Chen 172) Thus, Zhuangzi’s emphasis on living a life which is in accord with heaven is a reminder of the value of a more natural kind of life that is free of what he regards as the elements of a corrupting social structure and its artificially imposed standards of “right and wrong” (是非).

Second, there is the possibility of changing some of our emotional attitudes, especially with regard to our ordinary reactions toward death. As mentioned before, this is a central theme in the *Zhuangzi*. Zhuangzi himself, for instance, is

described as singing at his wife's funeral in the *Zhi Le*. (〈至樂〉, Chen 469) Hui Shi, who has come to mourn, is shocked by his behavior. He reminds Zhuangzi of his relationship with his wife: they lived together, she bore him children, she had grown old (together with him in companionship) and now she has died. It is (bad) enough that he is not crying. But he is drumming away and singing—isn't this too much? From Hui Shi's point of view, it is heartless not to grieve given the relationship that Zhuangzi has had with his wife. Zhuangzi replies that at first, he could not help but feel grief. Then he reflected upon his wife's transformations: from nothing, to coming into the world, living and then dying. The whole process seems to him like the natural progression of the four seasons. If he were to continue wailing it would mean that he does not understand *ming* (命) and therefore he stopped. (As explained earlier, for Zhuangzi, *ming* refers to the inevitability of natural events without either negative or positive emotional connotation).

If we assume that Zhuangzi has truly managed to stop grieving, this is the result of his realization that the emotion of grief in such a situation is the result of a false belief and consequently a mistaken judgment. That is, it is false to believe that death constitutes a loss and it is a mistake to judge that death is a bad thing and hence to grieve. Once he has reflected on the matter, Zhuangzi re-orientates himself to the view that in fact, the death of his wife is part of an ongoing heavenly process and as such there is no loss. Since what he values is heaven or the natural, and the death of his wife is part of a heavenly process, there is no reason for him to grieve.

4. Conclusion

We had set out to answer the question of what it means for Zhuangzi to claim that it is possible to be without the *qing* of human beings. This claim is situated within a contrast that Zhuangzi constantly makes between heaven on the one hand, and human beings on the other. Having described some contexts for this contrast and after examining the various meanings of *qing*, we noted that in both the passage and dialogue in question, the term *qing* in *wu ren zhi qing* (無人之情) or more simply, *wu qing* (無情) refers to certain facts that human beings have added to their lives. These include the facts of moral, social and political structures and relations, and also the factual beliefs involved in certain emotions (such as grief). In other words, Zhuangzi is suggesting the possibility of disengaging oneself from these human-made structures and relations and certain (false or mistaken) beliefs.

Hui Shi questions the intelligibility for human beings, *qua* human beings, to

be without these facts. Zhuangzi assumes the existence of a heavenly or natural state of the human being that is free of criteria and norms of what it is to be a human being, as constructed by human beings. He also assumes the possibility that human beings can disengage themselves from certain social structures, relations, and certain beliefs attending the emotions. Though this may seem to be a radically impossible view, I have indicated two more limited ways of understanding this. First, that Zhuangzi is protesting against the corrupting nature of a certain social structure such as the Confucian one, and calling for a way of life more in accord with heaven, i.e., suggesting more “natural” ways of living our lives. At the same time, though, he does seem to recognize that what constitutes being more “heavenly” or “natural” is not something which is self-evident.

Second, Zhuangzi can be taken to suggest, in his remarks about being without the *qing* of human beings, that it is possible to re-orientate ourselves with regard to *some* emotions such as grief in the context of death. We conventionally grieve in this context, but this emotion is based upon a false belief and mistaken judgment about death being a loss. From the perspective of heaven there is no loss and no reason to grieve.

Most English translators have rendered *qing* in the passage and the dialogue as “emotions” and other similar or related terms. This is not entirely wrong. But if we simply leave it at that, there are two problems. First, if we read being “without the *qing* of human beings” as being without human emotions, this could mean that Zhuangzi is suggesting that we may do away with the emotions entirely. However, I have argued that there is no reason to think that this is what Zhuangzi means. Instead, he should be taken to mean that there are certain emotions in certain contexts that are inappropriate. And this leads us to the second problem with simply reading *qing* as “emotions”. That is, this reading misses out on the wider philosophical issue that Zhuangzi is addressing, that human beings have imposed certain facts on their lives that are not in accord with heaven, including the false belief and judgment over the facts that are involved in the emotion of grief. This issue, as I have tried to show, is what the passage and dialogue that we have discussed are essentially about. Missing out on this issue through simply reading *qing* as “emotions” leaves a substantial gap in our understanding of the philosophy of Zhuangzi.

In this regard, I have been careful throughout the discussion to mention being “without the *qing* of human beings” (無人之情), instead of just the shorter being “without *qing*” (無情). The former phrase more clearly expresses what I have stressed, that Zhuangzi is concerned with disengaging ourselves from the structural facts that have been imposed by human beings onto their lives. In the

dialogue, the shorter *wu qing* is used. However, the dialogue is prompted by the preceding passage where clearly, *wu ren zhi qing* is mentioned. Interestingly, in earlier versions of this paper, I found myself tending to lapse into the usage of the shorter and more convenient *wu qing* instead of *wu ren zhi qing*. Perhaps this convenience is also the reason why Zhuangzi and Hui Shi, too, use (or are written as using) *wu qing* in conversation. But insofar as we forget that this is an abbreviation for *wu ren zhi qing*, it can be taken to mean (mistakenly) that Zhuangzi is suggesting doing away with the emotions *per se*. As I have argued above, however, there is a wider social and structural issue at stake.

I have based my reading of *qing* as primarily referring to the “facts” on an exhaustive study of all the occurrences of *qing* in the *Zhuangzi*. The usage of *qing* in the Inner Chapters, as we have seen, is basically in the form, “X *zhi qing*” where X could refer to any number of things, and in this regard, *qing* does clearly refer to the facts or the fundamental facts about something. Of course, these facts could also refer to the dispositional facts about things and human beings. But this comes out more clearly and explicitly in the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters, especially in terms of *xing qing* (性情), a term which does not occur at all in the Inner Chapters. It refers to the nature of something, not just of human beings, but frequently also to the nature of animals and objects. In this regard, the term *xing ming zhi qing* (性命之情) is also used very often.

Note that the term *qing yu* (情欲) appears only once. This is in the last chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, the *Tianxia* (〈天下〉), which describes the characteristics of the various philosophers. Here, it is said of Song Xing (宋鉞) and Yin Wen (尹文) that they *yi qing yu gua qian wei nei* (以情欲寡淺爲內). (Chen 888) In other words, they cultivated themselves such that they did not have an excess of emotions and had (relatively) few desires which were not overindulged. This single appearance of *qing yu* can hardly be used in helping us understand the notion of *qing* in the *Zhuangzi* (especially in the Inner Chapters) and the dialogue with which we have been concerned.¹⁷ We should mention that this term *qing yu* does appear more

17. In the *Zhuangzi*, *qing* and *yu* are more liable to appear separately in some sentences where it is clear that the former refers to the nature of something or someone. For instance, in the *Xu Wu Gui* (〈徐无鬼〉), Xu informs Wei Wu Hou (魏武侯): 君將盈耆欲, 長好惡, 則性命之情病矣。 (Chen 644) “If you try to fulfill all your appetites and desires and indulge your likes and dislikes, then you bring affliction to the true form of your inborn nature and fate.” (Watson 261) And in the *Dao Zhi* (〈盜跖〉): 今吾告子以人之情, 目欲視色, 耳欲聽聲, 口欲察味, 志氣欲盈。 “Now let me tell you something—about man’s true form. His eyes yearn to see colors, his ears to hear sound, his mouth to taste flavors, his will and spirit to achieve fulfillment.” Burton Watson (trans.), *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, p. 330.

frequently in, say, the *Xunzi* (荀子).¹⁸

If my reading is correct, there are only four instances where *qing* could be taken to refer to the emotions without much controversy. I have mentioned two of them in the discussion above, and two others in the notes.¹⁹ Three of these occur in the Miscellaneous Chapters, and one in the Outer Chapters. As for the occurrence of *qing* in the passage and dialogue which we have been concerned with in this essay, I have argued for the reasons already given above, that it should be read basically as the “facts”.

But while this seems to be in agreement with Graham, I do not support his proposal that *qing* should be translated as “essence”, especially when this can figure in a definition of the essence of human beings as “The *qing* of human beings is what human beings cannot lack if it is to be called ‘human being’.”²⁰ There is a sense in which “essence” does capture what Zhuangzi wishes to *deny*, namely, that there is any human essence as constituted by humanly imposed facts. But in this regard, the *qing* of human beings does not constitute an essence for Zhuangzi. It would also be a mistake, on the other hand, to think that Hui Shi believes that there is a human essence. Hui Shi is saying that there are certain facts that constitute human beings, but it is left open what these facts are. Or at least he doesn’t himself specify what these must be, since he is only questioning Zhuangzi’s claim that human beings can have a heavenly form that allows them to *qun* (congregate) without imposing factual structures of their own. Since it is left open what these are or could be, we cannot say that he is specifying that human beings must have some essence.

18. Anthony Yu finds a very close connection between *qing* and *yu* in the *Xunzi*. He says, for instance: “In my brief exposition of Xunzi thus far, I have concentrated on the verbal and conceptual alliance of *qing* and *yu* in which the latter, under stimulation, is a functional manifestation of the former. Xunzi’s remarks, however, make apparent as well that in much of ancient Chinese thought, that process of stimulus and response also defines the emotional contours of the human subject.” See Anthony C. Yu, *Rereading the Stone*, p. 67. I have discussed the role of *qing* in the philosophy of Xunzi in “Xunzi and the Essentialist Mode of Thinking on Human Nature,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 35.1 (2008), pp. 63–78.

19. See note 12 above.

20. See A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” *Studies in Chinese Philosophy & Philosophical Literature*, p. 63: “From Hui Shih’s questions we may deduce a definition of *ch’ing*. The *ch’ing* of X is what X cannot lack if it is to be called ‘X’; the difference from Aristotelian essence is that it relates to naming, not being. Mencius uses the word in just this sense, although for him what is essential to Man is self-evidently good while for Chuang-tzŭ it is self-evidently bad.” I disagree with Graham that for Zhuangzi the essence of human beings is “self-evidently bad.”

In my introductory remarks to this essay I stated that it is not my direct purpose to discuss the controversy surrounding Graham's reading of *qing*. Instead, my aim has been to understand what is meant by the suggestion that one can be without the *qing* of human beings. As we have seen, this is a philosophical and logical issue involving the possibility of human beings disengaging themselves from social structures which are regarded as unnatural and corrupting. Although this has necessitated a study of *qing* as it occurs throughout the *Zhuangzi*, I have not been concerned with the meaning of *qing* as it occurs in other early Chinese texts and I doubt if a reading of these texts would have been of much help with the philosophical/logical issue that I have tried to describe through explicating the dialogue between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi.

In reading *qing* as basically referring to the "facts" in the *Zhuangzi*, I am not saying that this is how it must be read in other texts. Also, I do not wish to give the impression that I think it is a narrowly circumscribed term. In a recent study of the term in a few early texts, Michael Puett has proposed that *qing* has a "broad semantic range, including such meanings as basic tendencies, inclinations, dispositions (including emotional dispositions), and fundamental qualities."²¹ Despite noting this semantic range, Puett chooses to focus his discussion on a debate in which *qing* figures as "basic emotional dispositions". Thus, there is no contradiction between holding that *qing* has a "broad semantic range" on the one hand, and focusing on a particular aspect of the term within a particular context, or thinking that it primarily means the "facts" within the *Zhuangzi* (especially in the Inner Chapters) as I have done. I would like to go further to suggest that part of the problem with understanding the semantic range of *qing* is our contemporary tendency to firmly separate the notion of the "facts" from the "emotions".

Thus, in the controversy surrounding how *qing* is to be read, it has seemed

21. Michael Puett, "The Ethics of Responding Properly," in Eifring, Halvor ed., *Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature*, p. 42. Puett focuses on a debate that he finds in early Chinese thought concerning the significance of the traditional canonical texts (*Poetry, Documents, Rituals, and Music* 《詩》, 《書》, 《禮》, 《樂》) which may be said to help refine *qing* in the sense of basic emotional dispositions, or whether these should be controlled. He discusses some passages from the *Xing zi ming chu* (《性自命出》), *Xunzi* (《荀子》), *Huainanzi* (《淮南子》), and a passage of Dong Zhongshu's (董仲舒) taken from the historical record of the early Han, the *Hanshu* (《漢書》). He mentions only a single passage from the *Zhuangzi*, the one in which *dun tian bei qing* (遁天倍情) occurs. Another wide-ranging discussion of *qing* is Christoph Harbsmeier, "The Semantics of *Qing* (情) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese," also in Eifring, Halvor ed., *Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature*.

puzzling that it could be read both as “facts” and as “emotions” or “passions”.²² But this will be less puzzling if we understand that the emotions constitute ways of seeing the world and how events in it affect us. In this regard, they are closely tied up with certain factual beliefs. According to the cognitive view of the emotions which was first articulated in the West by the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics, an emotion is not simply a passively felt movement in the way that one helplessly feels, say, the wind.²³ Grief, for example, has an intentional object. In the context of death, one sees *that* a valued someone is or will be permanently and irrevocably lost. This seeing at the same time involves a judgment of value that this constitutes a significant loss. In other words, human emotion is closely tied up with the belief in and the evaluation of certain facts. Thus, the cognitive view of the emotions—which Zhuangzi would agree with at least in terms of the emotion of grief—would help to alleviate the seeming puzzle that *qing* could refer to both “facts” and “emotions”. This is one advantage of the reading of *qing* in the passage and dialogue which we have been concerned to explicate in this essay, namely, as “facts” that have been socially constituted by human beings, including those relating to some emotions. Another advantage of this reading has already been mentioned. That is, we would not misconstrue Zhuangzi to suggest doing away with the emotions *per se*. Instead, Zhuangzi is con-

22. Chad Hansen has expressed this as having to deal with “two seemingly incongruous meanings,” and “This admixture is puzzling. If Chinese thinkers accept Western folk psychology, then emotions and feelings should be paradigms of subjective, inner phenomena—the exact opposite of circumstances, facts, and truth that we regard as objective and external.” See Chad Hansen, “*Qing* (Emotions) 情 in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” in Marks, Joel and Roger T. Ames eds., *Emotions in Asian Thought*, pp. 182–183. Hansen does not think that this view of Western folk psychology should apply to the early Chinese case. He sums up *qing* as “reality-induced discrimination or distinction-making reactions”, “reality feedback” or “reality inputs” that include the emotions and desires. See Marks, Joel and Roger T. Ames eds., *Emotions in Asian Thought*, pp. 196–197.

23. See Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 25. See also her *The Therapy of Desire—Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), especially chapter 10, “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions.” John Greenwood, *Realism, Identity and Emotion* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), chapter 9, “The Social Constitution of Emotion,” p. 153, puts it this way: “Many human emotions are essentially constituted as emotions by intrinsically social forms of evaluative representation directed upon socially appropriate objects. They are socially constructed in the following respect: they are created or constructed out of arrangements, conventions, and agreements concerning the evaluation of actions and social relations, including those concerning the appropriate objects of such forms of evaluation.” The extent toward which one can disengage oneself from certain emotions is an issue which needs further investigation.

cerned with disengaging from human-imposed or social structures which are not (seen as being) in accord with heaven or the natural. For him, an emotion such as grief and the mourning rituals over death are based on mistaken beliefs engendered by such human structures.

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莊子與惠施論「情」

莊錦章

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摘 要

本文旨在探討《莊子·德充符篇》中莊子與惠施對話時有關於「無人之情」的觀念，此觀念隱含在莊子經常引用「天人之分」的區分之中，這個區分於某些文本之中是有所闡釋的。本文的結論是：在《莊子》中，「情」基本上應被解讀為「事實」，包括一些關於情感(無論是假的或者是錯誤的)的事實性信念。

關鍵詞：莊子，惠施，情，天，人

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